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UNDERSTANDING VENTURE CAPITAL STRUCTURE:
A TAX EXPLANATION FOR CONVERTIBLE
PREFERRED STOCK
Ronald J. Gilson* and David M. Schizer**
The capital structures of venture capital-backed U.S. companies
share a remarkable commonality: overwhelmingly, venture capitalists
make their investments through convertible preferred stock.1 Not sur-
prisingly, much of the academic literature on venture capital has
sought to explain this peculiar pattern.' Financial economists have
developed models showing, for example, that convertible securities ef-
ficiently allocate control between the investor and entrepreneur,3 signal
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I Section I.A., infra, outlines the recent empirical research on venture capital structure. By
way of background, preferred stock offers investors more senior rights than common stock. Typi-
cally, preferred stockholders have a prior claim to dividends and proceeds of a liquidation (a term
that, in the venture capital context, typically includes certain sales of the business as well as
dissolutions). Preferred stockholders usually also have superior "control" rights. They often have
extra voting power on certain issues and, in the venture capital context, the right to appoint a
designated number of the board of directors. Preferred stock is "convertible" if it can be
exchanged for a designated number of common shares. Such conversion usually occurs at the
option of the investor but, in the venture capital context, it is also mandatory after a successful
initial public offering (IPO).
2 See George G. Triantis, Financial Contract Design in the World of Venture Capital, 68 U.
CHI. L. REV. 305, 322 (2ooi) (reviewing PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE
CAPITAL CYCLE (1999)) (noting that convertible preferred stock is a distinctive feature in ven-
ture capital finance).
3 See, e.g., THOMAS HELLMANN, IPOs, ACQUISITIONS AND THE USE OF CONVERTIBLE
SECURITIES IN VENTURE CAPITAL (Graduate Sch. of Bus., Stanford Univ., Research Paper
No. 1702, 2ooo), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstractjid=2576o8 (explain-
ing how convertible securities implement "an optimal trade-off between the need to allocate cash
flows" and the desire to make efficient exit decisions); Erik Bergl6f, A Control Theory of Venture
Capital Finance, so J.L. ECON. & ORG. 247, 248 (1994) (noting that the allocation of control and
returns that convertible preferred stock achieves "protects the initial contracting parties as much
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the entrepreneur's talent and motivation, 4 and align the incentives of
entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. 5
In this Article, we examine the influence of a more mundane factor
on venture capital structure: tax law. Portfolio companies 6 issue con-
vertible preferred stock to achieve more favorable tax treatment for
the entrepreneur and other portfolio company employees. The goal is
to shield incentive compensation from current tax at ordinary income
rates, so managers can enjoy tax deferral (until the incentive compen-
sation is sold, or longer) and a preferential tax rate.7 No tax rule ex-
as possible against dilution and extracts from a future buyer of the firm"); William W. Bratton,
Venture Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and Corporate Control, ioO MICH. L. REV. 891
(2002) (examining preferred stockholders' control when companies perform poorly). But cf.
STEVEN N. KAPLAN & PER STROMBERG, FINANCIAL CONTRACTING THEORY MEETS
THE REAL WORLD: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF VENTURE CAPITAL CONTRACTS 28 (Ctr.
for Research in Security Prices, Working Paper No. 513, 2ooo), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
s013/papers.cfm?abstract-id=228134 (stating that control theories "do not fully explain VC financ-
ings"); Paul A. Gompers, Ownership and Control in Entrepreneurial Firms: An Examination of
Convertible Securities in Venture Capital Investments 3 (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the Harvard Law School Library) ("The use of convertible financing needs to be understood
in the context of the broad range of control mechanisms that are employed by venture capital-
ists.").
4 See, e.g., FRANCESCA CORNELLI & OVED YOSHA, STAGE FINANCING AND THE ROLE
OF CONVERTIBLE DEBT (London Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 253-1997, 1997), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract id=48581 (finding that convertible securities can
prevent signal manipulation by the entrepreneur); Jeremy C. Stein, Convertible Bonds as Back-
door Equity Financing, 32 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 15 (1992) ("A convertible issue reveals a firm to be of
medium quality, whereas an equity issue reveals a firm to be of bad quality."); Gompers, supra
note 3, at 27 ("[Cjonvertible preferred equity is a potentially effective means of screening out low
ability entrepreneurs ...."); Leslie M. Marx, Contract Renegotiation in Venture Capital Pro-
jects 22 (2000) (working paper, on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (finding that "good
entrepreneurs use a combination of debt and the granting of control rights to distinguish them-
selves from bad entrepreneurs").
5 See, e.g., Richard C. Green, Investment Incentives, Debt, and Warrants, 13 J. FIN. ECON.
ii5, 129-30 (1984) (suggesting that convertibles are "particularly well suited to the problem of
controlling risk incentives"); Leslie M. Marx, Efficient Venture Capital Financing Combining Debt
and Equity, 3 REV. ECON. DESIGN 371, 372 (1998) (exploring which capital structure optimizes
the level of intervention by the venture capitalist); William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Gov-
ernance of Venture-Capital Organizations, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 473, 5 (i990) (noting that "[f]lexible
conversion terms alter the risk-and-reward-sharing scheme" and encourage entrepreneurs to build
value); Gompers, supra note 3, at i ("[U]se of a convertible security, as opposed to straight equity
or straight debt financing, serves to motivate the founder to exert the proper effort and avoid im-
proper risk taking.").
6 By "portfolio company," we mean a firm that is financed by a venture capitalist.
7 Stock that an individual holds for more than one year is generally eligible for the long-term
capital gains rate. See section l(h). If other conditions are satisfied, including a five-year holding
period, the owner of stock in a small business is eligible for a further rate reduction under section
1202. A holder of small business stock can also benefit from the "rollover" rule of section 1045,
under which tax that otherwise would be due from a sale of stock is deferred if the taxpayer rein-
vests sale proceeds in other qualifying stock.
Unless otherwise indicated, the phrase "section" refers to a section of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 (I.R.C.), as amended and codified at 26 U.S.C. (2000). The phrase "regulation" re-
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plicitly connects the employee's tax treatment with the issuance of
convertible preferred stock to venture capitalists. Rather, this link is
part of tax "practice" - the plumbing of tax law that is familiar to
practitioners but, predictably, is opaque to those, including financial
economists, outside the day-to-day tax practice.8 Despite its obscurity,
this tax factor is likely of first-order importance. 9 Intense incentive
compensation for portfolio company founders and employees is a fun-
damental feature of venture capital contracting.10
Venture capital structure thus performs double duty, addressing
standard contracting concerns (which are the grist of the existing aca-
demic literature) while also reducing taxes. Our analysis places con-
vertible preferred stock at the intersection of two sets of contracts: a
set of viable "economic" contracts that respond to control, signaling,
and incentive problems associated with early-stage, high-tech financ-
ings, and a set of viable "tax" contracts that minimize the tax on incen-
tive compensation. While some economic contracts yield less desirable
tax results, and some tax contracts yield less desirable economic re-
sults, convertible preferred stock reflects the intersection of the two
sets - a straightforward (and now familiar) way to pursue both eco-
nomic and tax goals." This dual role is the key to its dominant posi-
tion.
In elucidating the tax advantages of convertible preferred stock, we
highlight an important tax subsidy for the venture capital market that
is well understood among high-tech entrepreneurs and investors, but
otherwise is largely unknown. Although this subsidy has developed
inadvertently, it has an interesting structure. The government does
not provide funds directly to companies it selects (a familiar technique
fers to regulations promulgated by the U.S. Department of the Treasury (the Treasury) to imple-
ment the Internal Revenue Code.
8 To be sure, this tax strategy is aggressive because it is based on naive economic assump-
tions, as discussed below. Nonetheless, the tax strategy is widely used, and the tax authorities
have shown no appetite for challenging it. See infra section III.B.
9 Of course, tax planning does not always feature prominently in venture capital structure.
As Professor Bankman shows in an important paper, new ventures are often structured as corpo-
rations, even though use of the partnership form would enable venture capitalists to maximize the
tax reduction associated with tax losses. Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-
Ups, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1737, 1738 (994). However, Bankman focuses on the tax treatment of
venture capitalists, not the entrepreneurs and managers on whom we focus here. Id. at 1747. But
see id, at 174o n.3 (noting the tax benefit that managers gain from convertible preferred stock).
Empirical evidence suggests that entrepreneurs and managers are indeed tax sensitive. See PAUL
A. GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, WHAT DRIVES VENTURE CAPITAL FUNDRAISING? 8 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W69o6, 1999), available at http://papers.nber.org/
papers/w6go6.pdf. In addition, the tax planning discussed in this Article strengthens incentive
compensation, a central feature of venture capital contracting. See infra section I.B.
10 See infra section I.B.
11 We are grateful to Thomas Hellmann for suggesting this framework.
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outside the United States12 ), or to all companies. Instead, venture
capital investors serve as the subsidy's gatekeepers. As a practical
matter, only companies that can attract venture capital investment re-
ceive this tax subsidy. Our analysis thus adds a different twist to the
familiar debate over whether the government should provide subsidies
through the tax system, instead of through direct expenditures or fa-
vorable regulatory treatment. 13
Finally, as a matter of academic craft, our analysis suggests the dif-
ficulty of financial modeling for activities in which low-visibility,
"practice"-level patterns are of first-order significance. Unless in-
formed by institutional knowledge deep enough to reveal such pat-
terns, models will miss a significant factor that is influencing behavior.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I reviews the two elements of
the venture capital landscape on which our analysis builds: the perva-
sive use of convertible preferred stock and the importance of highly
incentivized compensation for employees. Part II surveys the current
range of explanations for the ubiquity of convertible preferred stock.
Part III explains why granting convertible preferred stock to venture
capitalists is thought to reduce the tax burden on managers' incentive
compensation. Part IV considers other ways of pursuing this tax ob-
jective and shows that each bears potentially significant costs. After
explaining how the tax advantages that we identify here function as a
subsidy for venture capital, Part V evaluates the unusual characteris-
tics of this subsidy's structure.
I. Two ELEMENTS OF THE VENTURE CAPITAL LANDSCAPE
Our analysis of the influence of tax law on venture capital structure
builds on two distinctive features of venture capital contracting. The
first is the ubiquity of convertible preferred stock. As an empirical
matter, venture capitalists typically receive this form of security when
investing in early-stage companies. The second is the pervasiveness of
incentive compensation. Portfolio company employees receive it as a
means of addressing the extreme uncertainty, information asymmetry,
12 See DIRECTORATE GENERAL ENTERPRISES, EUROPEAN COMM'N, EUROPEAN
TREND CHART ON INNOVATION: TREND REPORT. "INNOVATION FINANCE" 5-8 (2001),
available at http://trendchart.cordis.lu/Reports/Documents/InnovationFinanceDe2ooo.pdf);
ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., GOVERNMENT VENTURE CAPITAL FOR TECH-
NOLOGY-BASED FIRMS 9-i 1 (997).
13 Compare, e.g., Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government
Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 734 (1970)
(criticizing tax expenditures), with Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The
Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973, 975-76 (1986) (defending tax incentives);
see also MARK KELMAN, STRATEGY OR PRINCIPLE? THE CHOICE BETWEEN REGULATION
AND TAXATION 5 (1999) (assessing "the practical virtues and pitfalls of regulatory taxation").
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and potential for opportunism inherent in early-stage ventures. 14
These two elements provide the context for our tax analysis: the use of
convertible preferred stock as a financing instrument favorably influ-
ences the tax treatment of portfolio company employees' incentive
compensation.
A. The Ubiquity of Convertible Preferred Stock
The widespread use of convertible preferred stock in the venture
capital market stands in stark contrast to its use in publicly traded
corporations. Only some ten percent of U.S. public companies in
Standard & Poor's COMPUSTAT database have an outstanding class
of convertible preferred stock.15 In contrast, this security is practically
the exclusive means of external financing for U.S. venture capital-
backed companies. Steven Kaplan and Per Str6mberg provide the
most recent data. Their sample includes i i8 U.S. portfolio companies
and 200 venture capital-backed financing rounds, of which 159 were
completed between 1996 and 1999.16 Fourteen different U.S. venture
capital partnerships led these rounds, and more than ioo different ven-
ture capital partnerships made investments. 7 Of the 20o rounds, 189,
or 94.5%, used convertible preferred stock.' 8 This finding is consistent
with earlier surveys. 19
Thus, we start our analysis with a clear landmark: a monolith
dominates the landscape of U.S. venture capital structure. Explaining
this phenomenon has shaped much of the academic venture capital lit-
erature.
14 The term "uncertainty" refers to contingencies that none of the parties can definitively pre-
dict (for example, the success of a firm's research and commercialization efforts, the market's ul-
timate receptivity to a firm's product, the success of competing research efforts, and macroeco-
nomic and industry conditions), while "information asymmetry" refers to circumstances in which
one party knows more about a particular fact relevant to the business than the other party does
(for example, an employee or manager knows more about how hard she works than the venture
capitalist does).
15 Calculations performed by the authors based on COMPUSTAT data.
16 KAPLAN & STROMBERG, supra note 3, at 9-io.
17 Id. at 9, ii.
18 Id. at 13. Of the 189 rounds, 159 used convertible preferred stock exclusively (79.5%), while
an additional 30 included other types of securities as well (bringing the total to 94.5%). See id. at
50 tbl.i. While 72 rounds used a particular variant of convertible preferred stock called partici-
pating preferred stock, the difference is not significant to our analysis. See id.
19 See Gompers, supra note 3, at 15 (noting that in a sample of twenty-eight financing rounds
completed during the early stage of a venture capital limited partnership, the venture capitalists
received convertible preferred stock in all but five rounds); see also Sahlman, supra note 5, at 504
(describing the specific terms involved in structuring convertible preferred stock agreements in
the venture capital context).
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B. The Role of Intense Incentives in Venture Capital Contracting
All financial contracting confronts three fundamental problems:
uncertainty, information asymmetries, and agency costs. 20 These prob-
lems are especially acute in high-tech startups. Because these ventures
are in an early stage and the relevant technologies may well be un-
tested, most of the important decisions bearing on the company's suc-
cess have not yet been made. This reality exacerbates not only uncer-
tainty, but also information asymmetries between investors and
entrepreneurs, as "intentions and abilities are far less observable than
actions already taken. '2 1  Entrepreneurs may exploit their informa-
tional advantage for their private benefit.2 2 The potential for these
agency costs is aggravated by the significant variance associated with
early-stage companies' expected returns.23
A pivotal response to these contracting problems is the structure of
the entrepreneur's compensation. Because of information asymmetries
and uncertainty associated with future management decisions, the con-
tract between venture capital investors and portfolio company manag-
ers is incomplete; ex ante, the parties cannot specify what actions the
managers should take to increase firm value. Perhaps more dramati-
cally than any other element of venture capital contracting, the portfo-
lio company's compensation structure responds to this problem by cre-
ating high-powered performance incentives that align the interests of
investors and employees. An overwhelming percentage of manage-
ment's compensation depends on firm performance. The potential for
dramatic appreciation in the value of stock and options thus offsets
low salaries.2 4
A highly incentivized compensation structure also reduces informa-
tion asymmetries concerning the skills of entrepreneurs and managers.
Because an entrepreneur has better information about her skills than
the venture capital investor, and because a highly incentivized com-
20 This discussion draws on Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons
from the American Experience (working paper, forthcoming 55 STAN. L. REV. (2003), on file with
the Harvard Law School library).
21 Id. at 13.
22 See Gompers, supra note 3, at 6.
23 See generally JOHN H. COCHRANE, THE RISK AND RETURN OF VENTURE CAPITAL
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, working Paper No. 8o66, 2OO) (noting the high variance of
venture capital returns).
24 Using intense managerial performance incentives to align management and investor incen-
tives also creates a parallel agency problem. In effect, such incentives may encourage managers
to take unwise risks because their share of potential gains will be considerably larger than their
share of losses. Other elements of the venture capital contracting structure, especially its govern-
ance aspects, provide high-powered monitoring to balance the high-powered incentives. See Gil-
son, supra note 20, at 19-21. See generally PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS,
ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 240 (1993) (explaining that "more resources should be
spent monitoring when it is desirable to give strong incentives").
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pensation structure is worth more to individuals with stronger skills,
an entrepreneur's willingness to accept such compensation signals her
skill level. In effect, every intense incentive serves also as a signal.25
While other elements of venture capital contracting also respond to
extreme levels of uncertainty, information asymmetries, and agency
costs, management compensation is central. Thus, we can expect fac-
tors that facilitate intense incentive compensation to be an important
influence on venture capital structure. As we will see, this link helps
explain the ubiquity of convertible preferred stock; using this security
as a vehicle for venture capital investment reduces the tax cost of im-
plementing intensely incentivized management compensation.
II. CURRENT EXPLANATIONS FOR THE USE OF CONVERTIBLE
PREFERRED STOCK
A significant literature has sought to explain the ubiquity of con-
vertible preferred stock in venture capital structure. These accounts
show that one or more of the formal characteristics of convertible pre-
ferred stock, as it is used in the venture capital context,26 solve one of
the incomplete contracting problems that venture capital investment
presents.2 7  These theories have explanatory power, in our view, and
are reinforced by the tendency of contracts to become standardized:
once a market practice develops, parties find advantages in conformity
even if the practice is not a perfect fit. Yet the power of standardiza-
tion should not be overstated, since parties will depart from market
practice when a departure is profitable enough to overcome the infor-
mation costs they will incur.28 In addition, standardization does not
25 Gilson, supra note 2o, at 22; Gompers, supra note 3, at 4-5.
26 The convertible preferred stock typically used in the venture capital context has features
that are unique to this application. Most important, the overwhelming majority of this converti-
ble preferred stock provides for automatic conversion on the occurrence of an IPO. Kaplan and
Str6mberg provide empirical evidence of this characteristic. See KAPLAN & STROMBERG, supra
note 3, at 21 (noting that venture capital financings commonly include securities with automatic
conversion provisions, that these conditions generally relate to an IPO, and that they "require the
IPO to exceed a designated common stock price, dollar amount of proceeds, and/or market capi-
talization for the company"). Black and Gilson were the first commentators to discuss the incen-
tive function of this contractual term. See Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital
and the Structure of Capital Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243, 257-64
(1998) (noting that an IPO enables entrepreneurs to regain control of their ventures).
27 See sources cited supra notes 3-5, and accompanying text.
28 Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contract-
ing (or "The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 718-40 (1997) (arguing that path
dependency may dictate the continuation of one contracting form among an array of potential
substitutes); see also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Effi-
ciency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 592-6og (1984) (discussing information-cost barriers to introducing
new capital market instruments).
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explain how a practice first developed. On this point, four factors sug-
gest that the prevailing explanations are incomplete.
First and most important, the core preferences that define con-
vertible preferred stock - a preference over common stock in divi-
dend payments and liquidation - have only limited significance in the
venture capital context. Second, other securities can easily duplicate
the control features of convertible preferred stock. Third, while the
conversion feature is said to allocate control between managers and
venture capitalists on the question whether the firm is sold to an ac-
quirer or to public investors, in practice this feature is unlikely to op-
erate as modeled. Finally, existing accounts do not explain why con-
vertible securities appear to be used less frequently outside the United
States.
A. The Limited Significance of the Formal Attributes of Convertible
Preferred Stock
Convertible preferred stock provides preferences over common
stock in three areas: the payment of dividends, priority in liquidation,
and governance control. None of these preferences is sufficiently ro-
bust and unique to explain fully the near-universal use of convertible
preferred stock in the venture capital context.
i. Dividend Preferences. - Put simply, a dividend preference in
favor of preferred stock prohibits the payment of a common dividend
before the payment of a preferred dividend. The critical fact in
evaluating the importance of this preference is that, according to the
legal bible of Silicon Valley venture capital investing, "corporations
being financed with venture capital money are rarely in a position to
pay dividends to their venture capital investors, ' 29 let alone to the
holders of their common stock. And if no dividends are paid on
common stock, the dividend preference is unimportant.
To be sure, this preference can prove meaningful in some cases. To
be effective, the dividend preference must be cumulative, so that pre-
ferred dividends will accrue even if not currently paid. In that event,
the barrier to paying a common dividend will grow with time. Mak-
ing the dividend cumulative, however, is insufficient to make the pref-
erence meaningful because of the low probability that the portfolio
company will want to pay a common dividend before the convertible
preferred stock is converted either in an acquisition or (automatically)
in an IPO. Thus, a second step is necessary to give the cumulative
dividend preference real teeth: requiring the company to pay accumu-
29 Lee F. Benton et al., Hi-Tech Corporation: Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorpora-
tion, in i VENTURE CAPITAL & PUBLIC OFFERING NEGOTIATION 8-1, 8-8 (Michael J. Hal-
loran et al. eds., 3d ed. Supp. 2002).
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lated preferred dividends before common stockholders receive any li-
quidity on their investment. Parties can implement this condition me-
chanically by adding two features. First, they need to incorporate ac-
cumulated but unpaid dividends into the liquidation preference and
treat an acquisition of the portfolio company as a liquidation. Second,
they need to adjust the conversion ratio to reflect accumulated but un-
paid dividends.
But a more economically meaningful preference is hardly a univer-
sal practice:
[M]ost dividend provisions do not make dividends either mandatory or
cumulative.... Typically, venture capital financed companies do not rea-
sonably expect to be able to pay dividends to their stockholders prior to
going public, at which point the Preferred Stock will have converted into
Common Stock and the entitlement to dividends will have ceased. 30
2. Liquidation Preferences. - Like the dividend preference, the
preferred stock's liquidation preference could have economic
significance in some cases, but often proves insignificant. The reason
is that the dominant input in early-stage technology companies is
human capital. In transforming human capital into a product through
research and development, these ventures often have few hard assets,
especially if they subcontract out capital-intensive operations like
manufacturing, so the venture-backed portfolio company engages in
only human capital-intensive activities. The result undercuts the value
of the liquidation preference. In liquidation, holders of convertible
preferred stock cannot expect a significant payment because few, if
any, assets will remain after creditors are paid. The portfolio company
presumably will have spent invested cash by then, since venture
capitalists typically finance firms in stages.3 1 A failed Internet startup,
for example, might have a customer list, some computers and Aeron
30 Id. at 8-8 to 8-9; see also KAPLAN & STROMBERG, supra note 3, at 18 (noting that cumula-
tive preferred dividends were present in forty-six percent of the financings in their study). Al-
though some practitioners have expressed the view that Benton and his coauthors understate the
pervasiveness of cumulative dividends, we suspect that the presence of cumulative dividends is a
phenomenon similar to that of participating preferred stock in the venture capital context: they
are of relatively recent origin and affect only a subset of convertible preferred issuances.
31 See CORNELLI & YOSHA, supra note 4, at i ("Because of the great uncertainty and high
failure risk of new ventures, a widely used financing technique is the infusion of capital over
time."); Sahlman, supra note 5, at 5o6 ("Venture capitalists rarely, if ever, invest all the external
capital that a company will require to accomplish its business plan: instead, they invest in compa-
nies at distinct stages in their development."). While venture capitalists obviously will not want
to share their invested cash with the entrepreneur and managers in the unusual circumstance in
which assets remain after paying off creditors, venture capitalists have other means to prevent
such a transfer, aside from a preference. For instance, they can effectively give themselves a veto
by requiring a supermajority vote for a liquidation.
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chairs, and maybe a patent, but is also likely to owe back-rent, payroll,
and other liabilities.3 2
This is not to say that the liquidation preference has no impact, but
rather that its impact occurs in circumstances other than a "real" liq-
uidation following a portfolio company's failure. A merger or sale of
substantially all the assets of the portfolio company typically counts as
a liquidation that triggers the liquidation preference. In such cases,
the venture capitalists have a prior claim on acquisition proceeds and
are thus entitled to the lion's share of the sale of a "zombie" venture
whose business essentially breaks even. 33
For instance, assume that venture capitalists invest $i million in a
firm for io,ooo shares of convertible preferred, which would represent
50% of the common stock upon conversion, while managers pay
$io,ooo for io,ooo shares of common. If the firm is ultimately sold for
$1.3 million, the venture capitalists would not convert; instead, they
would collect their $i million liquidation preference, while common
shareholders would receive $300,000.
Venture capitalists can claim an even larger share of acquisition
proceeds if they receive "participating" preferred securities, a type of
convertible preferred stock that enables venture investors to share in
the proceeds of "liquidation" along with the common shareholders if
the proceeds exceed the amount of the preference. In the above exam-
ple, venture investors would claim their $i million liquidation prefer-
ence and also receive half of the remaining $300,000, leaving common
shareholders with only $I5o,ooo.
Admittedly, the preference would have a real effect in this context,
protecting the venture capitalists' investment in zombie cases. 3 4 Even
if this scenario constitutes only a subset of cases, lawyers presumably
would still want to provide for it, since lawyers are supposed to worry
about even remote risks. Yet while the zombie scenario certainly helps
to explain the preference, we wonder whether it looms so large in the
parties' minds as to be the sole, or even the main, determinant of capi-
tal structure; after all, the stereotypical risky venture-backed firm is
either a "home run" or a total failure. Moreover, the importance of the
participation feature should not be overstated, since it is both recent in
32 One way to test whether Internet startups have assets in liquidation is to ask whether failed
ventures have filed for bankruptcy - a proceeding that would be worthwhile only if there were
assets remaining to divide up among creditors. Based on conversations with practitioners, we
understand that few companies file such bankruptcies. We spoke with half a dozen practitioners
based in Silicon Valley during 2ooi and 2002. These practitioners requested that their names and
affiliations not be disclosed.
33 Practitioners sometimes refer to this scenario as "going sideways."
34 Even in this scenario, in which the preferences appear to be meaningful, there may be a
risk, as William Bratton suggests, that a court would not respect such a preference. See Bratton,
supra note 3, at 925 (noting that case law, especially in Delaware, is hostile to preferences).
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origin 35 and present in only some thirty-six percent of convertible pre-
ferred issuances. 36  Something else must be at work to explain this
long-term trend.
A second effect of the preference - especially if participating pre-
ferred securities are used - is to encourage venture capitalists to favor
exit through acquisitions rather than through IPOs. While venture
capitalists retain their preference in an acquisition, they lose it in a
successful IPO because their securities automatically convert to com-
mon stock.37 This effect is also unlikely to be sufficient to account for
the ubiquity of convertible preferred stock. Venture investors and
portfolio company management may well favor different means of exit,
especially since an acquisition typically will change management's po-
sition dramatically. A participation feature may exacerbate this ten-
sion. However, management's exit preference can be expected to be a
subject of ex ante bargaining, 38 and as a practical matter, allocation of
control over exit is not fully contractable. While it is easy to arm ei-
ther party with a formal veto, it is difficult to provide an exclusive ap-
proval right, because either party will typically have the practical ca-
pacity to block either track. Negotiation of an acquisition over
management's objections or of an IPO over the venture capitalists' ob-
jections is thus unlikely to be successful.
3. Allocation of Control. - A final characteristic of convertible
preferred stock is that it facilitates the separation of control and cash
flow rights. Venture capitalists typically have more control rights than
cash flow rights (for example, they might claim more than half of the
board seats but only one-quarter of the profits from an IPO). This
setup enables venture capitalists to monitor the firm without corre-
spondingly reducing managers' share of profits, a step that would un-
dermine management incentives. 39  In this investor-oriented control
structure, venture capitalists receive board seats, and detailed cove-
nants protect investors from management opportunism in specified
contexts. To be clear, the formal elements of convertible preferred
stock do play a role in separating control from cash flow rights. The
form has a greater effect here than in the case of liquidation and divi-
dend preferences.
35 See Benton et al., supra note 29, at 8-1i (describing the use of participating preferred stock
as "[t]he most significant change during recent years in the terms of the Preferred Stock being is-
sued").
36 See KAPLAN & STROMBERG, supra note 3, at 13. Participating preferred stock also offers
tax advantages over traditional convertible preferred stock. For a discussion, see infra notes 96,
105, 107, and accompanying text.
37 See HELLMANN, supra note 3, at 3. The IPO typically must attain a specified valuation in
order to trigger automatic conversion.
38 See id. at 5; Black & Gilson, supra note 26, at 258-59.
39 See KAPLAN & STROMBERG, supra note 3, at 6; Gompers, supra note 3, at 3.
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However, other securities can accomplish the same result, which
suggests that the separation of control and cash flow rights cannot
alone explain the prevalence of convertible preferred stock. As Profes-
sor Thomas Hellmann puts it, "there are typically several ways of
combining standard securities to implement the same optimal con-
tract .... These are thus different labels for the same solution. '40
Covenants can appear not only in the terms of the preferred stock, but
also in a purely contractual investors' rights agreement; in fact, in the
typical transactions, restrictions appear in both documents. 4' Like-
wise, while a transaction can allocate board representation between
common and preferred stockholders, it can also allocate representation
among different classes of common stock.42
To an extent, the pervasiveness of convertible preferred stock
probably derives from efficiencies of standardization. 43 Yet the ques-
tion remains why this security became the market standard in the first
place.
B. Financial Models of Convertible Preferred Stock in Venture Capital
Structure
The financial economics literature offers three explanations for the
ubiquity of convertible preferred stock in venture capital structure:
creating incentives and signaling, separating cash flow and control,
and allocating control rights in decisions about exit.44 While we ad-
mire the analysis in these models, we question whether they can fully
40 HELLMANN, supra note 3, at 2o; see also KAPLAN & STROMBERG, supra note 3, at 26 ("In
the contracts we study, control rights are important and separate from cash flow rights."); Gomp-
ers, supra note 3, at 3 ("The use of convertible financing needs to be understood in the context of a
broad array of control mechanisms that are employed by venture capitalists."). Kaplan and
Str6mberg found that the venture capitalist has significant control before the IPO and that con-
trol mechanisms are separable from cash flow allocation. See KAPLAN & STROMBERG, supra
note 3, at 24 ("VC financings allow VCs to separately allocate cash flow rights, voting rights,
board rights, liquidation rights, and other control rights.").
41 See Robert V. Gunderson, Jr. & Lee F. Benton, Hi-Tech Corporation: Investors' Rights
Agreement, in I VENTURE CAPITAL & PUBLIC OFFERING NEGOTIATION 9-i, 9-34 (Michael
J. Halloran et al. eds., 3d ed. Supp. 2ooi). Kahan and Yermack note that covenants are costly to
renegotiate and thus argue that convertibility is a superior alternative for publicly traded bonds,
because in this context renegotiation costs are high. See Marcel Kahan & David Yermack, In-
vestment Opportunities and the Design of Debt Securities, 14 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 136, 140 (1998).
But Gompers responds that renegotiation is much cheaper in the VC context, and so covenants
should be - and are - used. See Gompers, supra note 3, at 9-io.
42 See JACK S. LEVIN, STRUCTURING VENTURE CAPITAL, PRIVATE EQUITY, AND
ENTREPRENEURIAL TRANSACTIONS 205.1, at 2-22 (2ooi) ("[Entrepreneur] and VC can
agree upon an allocation of directors completely different from the equity split through the use of:
[a] voting trust agreement[, a] voting trust[, v]oting and nonvoting common[, v]oting and nonvot-
ing preferred[, and e]lection of different classes of directors by different classes of stock.").
43 See generally Kahan & Klausner, supra note 28.
44 See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
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explain, to use Kaplan and Str6mberg's phrase, "real world" venture
capital structure. 45 As the previous section suggests, these efforts to
derive optimal financial contracts, and then to observe their appear-
ance in the real world, present three problems.
First, they assume that the dividend and liquidation preferences of
convertible preferred stock are robust in the context of early-stage ven-
ture capital contracting. This assumption is particularly important in
incentive and signaling models, which rely on the liquidation prefer-
ence to make deals unattractive to low-quality entrepreneurs and
managers. Yet if the liquidation preference has only limited signifi-
cance, as we have argued, these models have less explanatory power.
Other than in the zombie scenario, there should be little difference be-
tween the prevailing capital structure and an all-common capital struc-
ture. Thus, while the models explain the right to convert as a way of
mitigating a manager's incentive to increase risk (because the conver-
sion right allows the venture capital investor to share in any upside re-
sulting from managerial risk-taking),46 the same mitigation should also
occur in an all-common capital structure. Convertible preferred stock
is used, the models claim, to protect the venture capitalist if the ven-
ture fares poorly, allowing managers to profit only from good out-
comes. The preference thus should encourage good management per-
formance and, relatedly, signal the quality of managers who accept this
incentive. But again, if the preference has only limited significance,
incentives and signals should be similar to those in an all-common
capital structure.47
Second, the models assume, typically implicitly, that convertible
preferred stock is necessary to separate control from cash flow.48
However, this desired allocation of control does not require a cash flow
preference. Different control rights could just as easily be assigned to
different classes of securities having the same cash flow rights, for in-
stance, through an all-common capital structure coupled with a share-
45 See KAPLAN & STROMBERG, supra note 3, at 2 ("Venture capitalists .. are real world en-
tities who most closely approximate the investors of theory.").
46 See Gompers, supra note 3, at 15 (stating that because entrepreneurs are typically not moni-
tored on a day-to-day basis and have the ability to cut corners in their desire to get to the market
quickly, convertible securities are one mechanism that venture capitalists can use to reduce such
risk-taking); cf. Green, supra note 5, at 125 (describing the risk-incentive problem in the context of
convertible debt).
47 For the same reason, the liquidation preference should not be especially effective in motivat-
ing venture capitalists to intervene to save failing ventures. Cf. Marx, supra note 5, at 372
("[WIhile pure debt gives the venture capitalist too great an incentive to intervene, and pure eq-
uity too little, a mixed debt-equity sharing rule enables the optimal level of intervention to be
achieved.").
48 Hellmann's model is a notable exception. See HELLMANN, supra note 3, at 8-13.
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holders' agreement. 49 To be sure, one might respond that this alterna-
tive is functionally identical to a capital structure featuring a converti-
ble preferred security, but this response makes the issue far too easy.
The models do not limit themselves to deriving the optimal financial
contract for venture capital structure, but also seek to explain the se-
curity choices actually observed. Thus, the models may explain the
substantive characteristics of venture capital structure, itself no small
accomplishment, but they do not fully explain the market's remarkable
convergence on a single form of security.
Third, Thomas Hellmann's interesting model highlights the impact
of security design on the allocation of the power to choose an exit
method - either an IPO or an acquisition.50  Yet it is doubtful that
the parties can fully contract in advance about exit in a venture capi-
tal-backed corporation, because human capital is the dominant nonfi-
nancial input. In an IPO, for example, it may be extremely difficult to
secure an underwriter if the venture capitalists oppose the offering.
Similarly, negotiating an acquisition may be extremely difficult if man-
agement opposes the transaction and can be expected not to cooperate
in the buyer's due diligence investigations and in transition efforts.
Managers have particular clout in a human capital-dominated com-
pany, because transition is the mechanism that helps transfer the com-
pany's most important assets. In any event, Hellmann recognizes that
parties can formally implement the substance of an optimal contract in
a variety of ways. Thus, the model is insufficient to explain the form
of security actually observed in the market. 51
C. Convertible Preferred Stock Is Not as Pervasive in Other
Jurisdictions
Finally, existing accounts do not explain why convertible securities
appear less frequently in other jurisdictions. For instance, in a recent
empirical study, Professor Douglas Cumming found that American
venture capitalists are much less likely to use convertible preferred eq-
49 William Bratton argues that a preference is needed to transfer control automatically to the
venture capitalist when the portfolio company enters bankruptcy. See Bratton, supra note 3, at
gio-ii. However, such a transfer would not necessarily occur automatically. As Bratton ac-
knowledges, bankruptcy is "a drastic and costly step to have to take," id. at 91I, and there is a
risk that preferences will not be respected in bankruptcy. Given these costs and risks, venture
capitalists may well be unable to use bankruptcy as a means of strengthening their negotiating
positions.
50 See HELLMANN, supra note 3, at 4 ("We examine how venture capital contracts optimally
allocate control rights and cash flow rights in a world where there is some uncertainty about
whether exit should occur through an acquisition or an IPO.").
51 For this reason, Black and Gilson rely on an implicit contract governing the entrepreneur's
right to choose an IPO backed up by a reputation market. See Black & Gilson, supra note 26, at
254-56.
[Vol. 116:874
UNDERSTANDING VENTURE CAPITAL STRUCTURE
uity to finance Canadian companies than they are to finance American
ones.5 2 If these securities truly are the best way to address incomplete
contracting problems in the venture capital setting, why are they not
prevalent everywhere? Variables absent in other jurisdictions must be
present in the United States that make this capital structure especially
appealing. In the following Part, we show that U.S. tax law is one
such variable.
53
III. THE IMPACT OF CONVERTIBLE PREFERRED STOCK ON THE
TAXATION OF INCENTIVE COMPENSATION
To this point, we have shown that existing explanations for the
widespread use of convertible preferred stock have explanatory power
but do not tell the whole story. The security's superior cash flow
rights often lack economic significance - indeed, the zombie scenario
is the only one in which the liquidation preference appears to have real
bite. In contrast, the security's superior control rights do have broad
economic significance, but can be replicated easily. Why, then, is con-
vertible preferred stock so dominant? In part, the answer may lie in
the tendency of contracts to become standardized, but the question
remains how this form became the market practice.
Another critical factor, U.S. tax law, has largely escaped academic
notice. Specifically, by awarding convertible preferred stock to ven-
ture capitalists, portfolio companies seek to lower the tax burden on
management's incentive compensation. Because such high-powered
incentives are central to venture capital contracting, this tax advantage
is a key reason for the security's pervasiveness.
52 See Douglas J. Cumming, United States Venture Capital Financial Contracting: Evidence
from Investments in Foreign Securities 2 (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Har-
vard Law School Library), available at http://hal-web.usc.edu/cleo/ALEA/cumming.pdf (noting
that convertible securities are not the most commonly used capital structure for American venture
capital in Canada). In our conversations with Canadian tax and corporate practitioners, some
described convertible preferred stock as a commonly used financing device, as in the United
States, while others warned of adverse Canadian tax consequences from using this security, see
infra note 6o, and indicated that other securities are more commonly used, including convertible
debt or multiple classes of common stock. Like Canadians, Europeans also use convertible pre-
ferred stock somewhat less frequently than do Americans. See ANDREAS BASCHA & UWE
WALZ, FINANCING PRACTICES IN THE GERMAN VENTURE CAPITAL INDUSTRY: AN
EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT 13-14 (Ctr. for Fin. Studies, Working Paper No. 2002/o8, 2002), avail-
able at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract-id=267 57 2 (noting that convertible pre-
ferred stock is used less frequently in Germany); ARMIN SCHWIENBACHER, AN EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS OF VENTURE CAPITAL EXITS IN EUROPE AND IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (EFA
2002 Berlin Meetings Discussion Paper, 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract id=3 o200 (observing that the use of convertible preferred stock is less common in
European venture capital transactions).
53 Our preliminary analysis also suggests that because of differences in the Canadian tax sys-
tem, convertible preferred securities can pose special tax problems in Canada and are less neces-
sary to achieve analogous tax goals. See infra note 6o.
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The critical event in this context is the awarding of common stock
or options to the founding entrepreneur and other portfolio company
managers near in time to a venture capital financing round. New eq-
uity incentives for management and new funding for the company
typically go hand in hand. A round of venture capital financing will
prompt the firm to expand and set new targets, occasions that require
the firm to hire new managers and create further incentives for exist-
ing employees.5 4
When a manager receives equity in a venture capital-backed com-
pany, U.S. tax law regards this equity as yielding a blend of compensa-
tion for services ("compensatory return") and appreciation in the value
of an investment ("investment return").5 5 The manager has a strong
tax preference for investment return for two reasons. First, compensa-
tory return is generally taxed earlier than investment return. In an
early-stage venture, such accelerated timing is a particular hardship:
entrepreneurs and managers typically do not have cash to pay taxes
because their equity compensation is not yet liquid. Second, compen-
satory return is taxed at the rate for ordinary income, which is ap-
proximately double the rate applicable to long-term capital gain. An
even lower rate can apply to investment return, moreover, if the man-
ager's equity qualifies as "small business stock" and certain other con-
ditions are satisfied.5 6  Given these differences, the manager will
strongly prefer to pay tax as an investor, and the firm will have a par-
allel preference in order to contain the cost of offering incentive com-
pensation. 57
54 For example, it is not uncommon for venture capitalists to condition the funding of a financ-
ing round on the portfolio company's hiring of an important executive. See KAPLAN &
STROMBERG, supra note 3, at 20.
55 The premise here is that the entrepreneur is contributing services instead of intellectual
property. If the parties can characterize the entrepreneur's contribution as property, the rules re-
garding compensation would not apply. Instead, the entrepreneur would not owe any tax upon
contributing the property to the venture, would have carry-over basis in the stock equal to her
basis in the contributed property, and would have capital gain or loss upon selling the stock. In
such a case, the tax planning strategies described above for converting ordinary compensation
income to capital gain would not be necessary. Yet many types of contributions cannot be charac-
terized as property. New employees face the additional hurdle that they must invest by them-
selves - and not as part of a group of investors who control the firm, as required under section
351. See LEVIN, supra note 42, 201.1, at 2-5 to 2-6.
56 The maximum stated ordinary income tax rate in 2002 is 38.6%, although the effective tax
burden is higher when payroll taxes and the phaseout of various deductions are considered. In
contrast, the maximum stated rate for long-term capital gain on stock is 20%. See id. at 2-5. Un-
der section 1202, this rate is reduced to 14% if various conditions, including a five-year holding
period, are satisfied, although the alternative minimum tax may soak up some of this additional
savings. See id. 201.1, at 9-26 n.i.
57 Of course, the tax disadvantage to the manager of receiving ordinary income is theoretically
offset by a tax advantage to the new firm. It can deduct amounts that managers include as ordi-
nary income, but not amounts included as capital gain. Obviously, in deciding whether an ar-
rangement truly is tax-advantaged, we must consider the tax position of all parties to a transac-
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Given the conceptual and practical difficulties of separating com-
pensatory and investment returns, tax law relies on formal conventions
to draw these boundaries. Planners, in turn, game these lines to
achieve a kind of tax alchemy - transmuting compensatory return
into investment return. For instance, when managers receive stock as
compensation, they commonly elect to pay tax on the compensatory re-
turn right away at ordinary income rates - when the stock still has a
low value - so that subsequent appreciation is taxed as investment
return. There is a real tradeoff here: to obtain a lower rate and tax de-
ferral for future profits, the manager must pay a current tax on the
profit to date - a tax that would not otherwise be due yet - thereby
forgoing the use of these tax dollars. Is this tradeoff favorable? The
answer is clearly "yes" if the profit to date - and thus the currently
taxed ordinary income - is a very low amount or, better yet, zero. A
low initial tax valuation of the stock is critical to this tax alchemy so
that the lion's share of the manager's return can be taxed more fa-
vorably. Planners use an analogous strategy - which also depends on
a low tax valuation for the common stock - when a manager receives
an option grant.
Thus, from a tax planning perspective, much depends on the valua-
tion of the portfolio company's common stock at the time the manager
receives equity compensation. The problem is that this award typi-
cally coincides with a venture capital financing round. Although the
manager wants a low valuation for her own stock for tax purposes, she
still wants venture capitalists to pay a high price for their investment.
To see the tension between these goals, suppose that a company simul-
taneously sells common stock to venture capital investors at $ioo per
share and to managers at $i per share. Without more, managers who
elect to be taxed on the stock's grant-date value would have $99 of
current ordinary income, reflecting their bargain purchase of the port-
tion. See Ronald J. Gilson et al., Taxation and the Dynamics of Corporate Control: The Uncertain
Case for Tax-Motivated Acquisitions, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF
THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER 271 (John C. Coffee, Jr. et al. eds., 1988). It is well understood that if
the firm were in the same tax bracket as the manager, the tax strategy described above would not
make sense. Cf. MYRON S. SCHOLES ET AL., TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY: A PLAN-
NING APPROACH 2oi-o2 (2d ed. 2002) (noting the tax inefficiency of incentive stock options if
the employer and the employee are subject to the same tax rate). Yet in the venture capital con-
text, the firm's effective tax rate is typically much lower. If the firm is taxed as a corporation, as
is usually the case, it has vastly more deductions than income in its early years and is not likely to
pay tax for an extended period of time. Not only is the present value of compensation deductions
much reduced, but these deductions also could be lost entirely if the firm experiences certain own-
ership changes. See section 382. If instead the firm is a partnership, the partners could theoreti-
cally use the deductions, but many of them would be tax exempt in the usual case. Moreover,
even taxable partners may be unable to use these deductions because of the passive loss rules. See
section 469. Thus, the conventional wisdom in such tax planning is to favor the tax position of
the manager, not of the firm.
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folio company's stock.58  In contrast, if the venture capitalist invests
instead in convertible preferred stock, managers are likely to claim a
much lower valuation for their common stock, thereby avoiding this
up-front tax.
At this point, the reader should recognize an apparent inconsis-
tency. For the common stock to have a low value, the preferred stock
must be worth more. The most likely claim for a difference in value is
the preferred stock's superior cash flow rights. Yet, as we emphasized
previously, these preferences have limited significance in the venture
capital context. As a result, the premium accorded to convertible pre-
ferred stock should be correspondingly modest. Indeed, the main
source of value in both convertible preferred and common stock is the
same: so-called "option" value, or the possibility of earning superior re-
turns if the venture succeeds. Since the tax advantage sought here
rests on economically naive assumptions, a caveat is in order. While
we believe the use of convertible preferred stock in venture capital-
backed portfolio companies is tax motivated, we do not mean to sug-
gest that this tax strategy is unassailable - merely that it is unas-
sailed. Yet tax planners have commonly employed this aggressive
strategy and, in the venture capital context, tax authorities have not
routinely challenged it.s9
To develop these points, this Part explains the tax rules governing
awards of equity or options to portfolio company managers, and how
convertible preferred stock figures into a strategy to reduce the tax cost
of incentivizing managers, whether the compensation is common stock,
incentive stock options, or nonqualified options. To be sure, tax rules
alone do not provide a full explanation for the popularity of converti-
ble preferred stock. In the United States, the tax planning goal -
transmuting the manager's compensatory return into investment re-
turn - can be accomplished with at least three alternative securities:
convertible debt, a unit composed of straight preferred stock and
common stock, or partnership "profits" interests. However, as Part IV
demonstrates, the first two alternatives introduce other tax or business
disadvantages. The third has a distinct tax advantage, but is usually
considered too complicated. 60
58 See infra p. 894.
59 To use the language of lawyers, we would not necessarily give a legal opinion that the strat-
egy "works," but we understand that aggressive valuations are routinely used.
60 An exploration of Canadian tax considerations is beyond this Article's scope (and, indeed,
beyond our expertise). Our preliminary sense, based on conversations with Canadian corporate
and tax practitioners, is that the use of convertible preferred stock as a tax-planning strategy in
Canada is at once more difficult and less necessary than in the United States. This practice is
more difficult because firms that issue certain types of preferred stock can be subject to various
adverse tax consequences, including a special tax upon paying dividends. See, e.g., ROBERT
COUZIN, FOREIGN INCOME: BUSINESS OPERATIONS IN CANADA, at A-57 to A-59 (BNA Tax
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A. The Importance of the Value of Common Stock in the Tax
Treatment of Incentive Compensation
The first step in our analysis is to explain why common stock's
grant-date value affects the manager's tax treatment when the man-
ager's compensation is either stock or options. Then, we will consider
how the common stock's valuation is affected when the venture capi-
talist receives convertible preferred stock instead of common stock.
i. The Manager Receives Common Stock. - Assume that a portfo-
lio company has secured a commitment from a venture capital firm to
invest $I million in exchange for io,ooo common shares (that is, to pay
$ioo per share), while the founding entrepreneurs hold another io,ooo
common shares. Further assume that, in anticipation of growth, the
company recruits a new chief executive officer and chief financial offi-
cer at the same time. To align their incentives with those of the ven-
ture capitalist, each officer purchases approximately five percent of the
company's common stock as part of her employment contract: iioo
shares each (out of 22,200 post-issuance outstanding shares) at $i per
share.61
Management Portfolio 995-2d, 1997). The practice is less necessary because other strategies can
help executives attain deferral and a reduced tax rate. See generally Daniel Sandier, The Tax
Treatment of Employee Stock Options: Generous to a Fault, 49 CANADIAN TAX J. 259 (200).
Specifically, under section 7 of the Canadian Income Tax Act, an employee who receives a com-
pensatory option: (i) is not taxable until the option is exercised; and (2) the tax rate on this gain is
reduced by half (or, to be more precise, a deduction is allowed for half of the taxable amount).
See Income Tax Act, R.S.C., ch. I (5th Supp.), pt. i, § 7 (1992); see also Sandier, supra, at 272-73.
This provision in effect gives the employee deferred low-tax treatment without requiring elabo-
rate structuring. Nevertheless, there may still be advantages to reducing the initial value of the
common and thus to using convertible preferred securities (or some other senior security). First,
the treatment described above, like the ISO regime, is available only if the exercise price on the
option is not less than the common's fair market value on the grant date. Second, the analysis
changes if the venture qualifies as a Canadian controlled private corporation under section 125(7)
of the Canadian Income Tax Act. See id. On one hand, the above exercise price requirement is
then waived (reducing the need for convertible preferred). See id. at 273-74. On the other hand,
a $5oo,ooo exclusion is provided for capital gain. See Income Tax Act, R.S.C., ch. I (5th Supp.)
pt. i, § iio.6; Sandler, supra, at 273-74. Thus, even though profit earned before exercise is still
taxed at a reduced rate, profit earned after exercise is taxed at an even lower rate (o% for the first
$5oo,ooo). There would seem to be an advantage, then, in shifting gains to the period after exer-
cise, a role that convertible preferred securities could play. It would be worthwhile to explore
whether convertible preferred securities are more commonly used in Canadian-controlled private
corporations than in other Canadian ventures. In any event, we encourage others with the requi-
site expertise to analyze the implications of Canadian tax law more thoroughly.
61 Thus, the venture capitalists and founders each have 45.05% of the firm, while the execu-
tives each have 4.95%. This hypothetical seems reasonable in light of the empirical evidence con-
cerning senior-management equity stakes in venture capital-backed companies. See, e.g., Mal-
colm P. Baker & Paul A. Gompers, Executive Ownership and Control in Newly Public Firms:
The Role of Venture Capitalists (1999) (working paper, on file with the Harvard Law School Li-
brary), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract-id=i65173 (showing that, on
average, CEOs of venture capital-backed firms held 19% of equity prior to any IPO).
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This simple deal saddles the new managers with a prohibitively
high tax bill. When service providers receive property as compensa-
tion, such as the common stock in our example, they generally pay tax,
at ordinary income rates, based on the property's fair market value. 62
The rule is simplest if the property is fully vested. When the managers
receive their stock, they owe tax based on the difference between the
$iioo each paid and the shares' fair market value. Each manager's
shares are arguably worth $iio,ooo, because the venture capitalist
paid this amount per share. 63 Thus, each manager would have ap-
proximately $I09,000 of ordinary income, a daunting prospect for a
manager whose cash salary may be insufficient to offset the tax.
Thereafter, each manager has a $iio,ooo basis in the shares and will
have capital gain or loss on any appreciation or depreciation realized
when she ultimately sells the shares (or later, if she reinvests the sale
proceeds in qualifying small business stock).64 Thus, the sizable com-
pensatory return is taxed initially and the investment return is taxed
later.
The story is a bit more complicated if the managers' shares are
subject to a vesting requirement, as is commonplace, but the undesir-
able result remains the same as long as the managers make a popular
tax election. Assume the shares do not vest for three years. Under the
default rule, no income is recognized and no tax is due until this vest-
ing date. The amount of income recognized depends on the shares'
value on the vesting date, not their value on the grant date.65 If each
manager's shares are worth $5.5 million after three years, that entire
value (less the $iioo each paid for the shares) is taxed as ordinary in-
come on the vesting date. The manager owes the tax even if she does
not (or cannot) sell the shares, because, for example, there is not yet a
public market for the company's stock. To avoid this outcome, man-
agers typically make a section 83(b) election. They pay tax as if the
shares were vested from the beginning (that is, the managers have or-
dinary income based on grant-date fair market value).66 No other tax
62 See section 83(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.83-i(a).
63 A more aggressive pro-taxpayer argument, sometimes advanced by practitioners, is that the
manager's stock - which represents 4.95% of the firm - should be valued at 4.95% of the value
of the $i million contributed by the venture capitalist, or $49,5oo. The premise here is that the
firm's value is given by this cash contribution (for example, assuming that only this cash would
remain if the firm liquidated immediately). But this theory fails to explain why the venture capi-
talist was willing to pay $i million for less than half of the firm - a fact strongly suggesting that
the firm's value exceeds $2 million. For a discussion of these alternative valuation theories in an
all-common capital structure, see LEVIN, supra note 42, 202.1.1, at 2-4 to 2-5. For a critique of
the liquidation method of valuing a start-up, see infra pp. 898-goo.
64 See section 1045.
65 See TIreas. Reg. § 1.83-1(0).
66 See Morton v. Comm'r, 1997 T.C.M. (RIA) 97,166, at 1095, 1103 ("Generally, fair market
value is 'the price at which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a will-
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is due until the shares are sold, and long-term capital gains rates apply
to the sale if the holding period has been satisfied.67  Under the elec-
tion, then, subsequent appreciation is taxed more favorably than the
stock's initial value (that is, as deferred long-term capital gains instead
of immediate ordinary income).
For the managers' tax treatment, then, the key fact is the value of
their shares on the grant date. If this valuation derives from the close-
in-time price that venture capitalists paid, the managers confront the
worst possible outcome: paying a large current tax at ordinary income
rates, while holding illiquid stock and little or no cash.
2. The Manager Receives Stock Options. - Valuation also plays a
central role when the managers' incentive compensation takes the
form of stock options. These options come in two varieties: "incentive
stock options" (ISOs) and "nonqualified stock options" (NQOs). A low
grant-date valuation of the common stock is helpful here for two rea-
sons. First, it enables options to qualify as ISOs, which offer the man-
ager significant tax advantages. Second, if the options cannot qualify
as ISOs, and must instead be tax-disadvantaged NQOs, well-advised
managers can use self-help to minimize the tax disadvantages of NQO
status - in effect, to simulate ISOs - as long as they can claim a low
valuation for the underlying common stock at the time of exercise (for
example, if the options are exercised on the grant date).
(a) Incentive Stock Options. - ISOs offer generous tax treatment
to managers and thus are more desirable than NQOs in the venture
capital context.68  As long as certain statutory preconditions are
satisfied, managers generally do not include the value of the options in
income either when they receive the options or when they exercise
them.6 9  Tax is due later - at capital gains rates - when managers
ing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell, and both having reasonable knowl-
edge of the relevant facts."' (quoting United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 551 (1973))). The
fair market value of these shares, when received, is not discounted for the fact that these shares
have not yet vested. See section 83 (b); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.83-2.
67 See Treas. Reg. § i.83-2(a) (providing that "no compensation will be includible in gross in-
come when such property becomes substantially vested"); id. § 1.83-4(a) (providing that the hold-
ing period for transferred property begins just after it has been transferred). As noted previously,
a lower rate will apply to qualifying small business stock. See supra note 56. If the taxpayer sub-
sequently forfeits the property, she generally cannot deduct the previously included amount. See
section 83 (b).
68 Unlike NQOs, ISOs offer no tax deduction to the employer. Thus, it is well understood that
ISOs are less tax efficient if the manager and employer are subject to the same tax rate. See, e.g.,
SCHOLES ET AL., supra note 57, at 201-02. As noted above, however, the employer in the ven-
ture capital context is typically subject to a very low effective tax rate. See supra note 57.
69 See sections 421(a) and 422; Treas. Reg. § i4a.422A-i. However, the managers may be sub-
ject to alternative minimum tax ("AMT"). This regime, a backup for the income tax, was in-
tended to prevent wealthy taxpayers from making excessive use of so-called tax "preferences,"
such as generous depreciation deductions. The "spread" on an ISO is treated as a tax preference,
causing AMT to be levied on the difference between the exercise price and the underlying stock's
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sell the stock they have received by exercising the option. In effect, the
managers' entire profit is deferred and then taxed as investment
return, not as compensatory return. With NQOs, in contrast, profit
earned before managers exercise the options is taxed as ordinary
income.
Yet in order for options to qualify for ISOs' souped-up tax treat-
ment, the statute imposes a precondition relating to valuation: the op-
tion exercise price cannot be less than the value of the underlying
stock on the grant date. 70 Using our example from Part III, if venture
capitalists have just paid $ioo per share for common stock, the exer-
cise price on managers' options must be at least $ioo per share, or the
options will not qualify as ISOs. But the options obviously would be
much more valuable with a lower exercise price. Indeed, the manager
would prefer options with a $i per share exercise price that still quali-
fied as ISOs. She therefore would like to be able to value the common
stock, for tax purposes, at $i per share on the grant date. 71
(b) Nonqualified Stock Options. - While a low valuation for the
common stock helps options with a low exercise price to qualify as
ISOs, other preconditions for ISO treatment sometimes cannot be sat-
isfied, including size limitations and holding periods.72 If NQO status
is unavoidable, well-advised managers can sometimes use self-help to
mitigate the adverse consequences of this status, as long as they can
assert a low valuation for the common stock.
The problem with NQOs is that employees generally owe tax - at
ordinary income rates - when they exercise the options;7 3 the tax is
based on the difference between the options' exercise price and the
fair market value when the option is exercised. See section 56(b)(3 ). The marginal tax rate gener-
ally is 28%. See section 55(b)(I)(A)(i)(II) (outlining the rate for taxable excess beyond $175,000).
Under some circumstances, taxpayers can claim a tax credit for the amount of the AMT they have
paid, reducing their income tax in later years. For a discussion, see Barbara J. Raasch & Judith
L. Rowland, Stock Option Planning, 77 TAXES, Jan. 1999, at 39, 41.
70 See section 4 22(b)(4 ). The Internal Revenue Code imposes several other preconditions as
well, including a holding period and an annual limit on the size of the option grant. See section
422(a)(I) (providing that, in order to qualify, a taxpayer must not dispose of the shares within two
years of the date of the grant of the option or within one year after the transfer of the shares to the
holder); section 4 22(d) (providing that the aggregate fair market value of the underlying shares,
determined when the option is granted, cannot exceed $ioo,ooo per calendar year per employee).
71 While ISOs and common stock can provide similar tax benefits to executives, at-the-money
ISOs can also provide a financial accounting benefit. For a discussion, see infra note 82.
72 See supra note 70.
73 See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(a). If the option has a "readily ascertainable fair market value"
when granted, the option is taxed when it is received, and not when it is exercised. Id. Yet op-
tions rarely satisfy this condition. For instance, an option that is not freely transferable does not
have "readily ascertainable fair market value" within the meaning of the regulation. Treas. Reg.
§ I.8 3 -7(b).
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stock's fair market value at the time of exercise.7 4 In contrast, when
the executive sells the stock, gain or loss is capital in character.7 5
Compared to ISOs, then, NQOs yield income that is taxed earlier and
at a higher rate, but only on profits earned before the option is exer-
cised. Any profit earned after exercise is taxed like the return on ISOs
- that is, at capital gains rates when the executive ultimately sells the
stock. Thus, as a self-help strategy to make the tax treatment of
NQOs approximate that of ISOs, managers can exercise the option
early, thereby attaining deferred capital gains treatment for post-
exercise appreciation.
Such self-help exacts two potentially significant costs, each of
which is mitigated by a low tax valuation for the underlying common
stock. First, to exercise the options managers must pay the exercise
price (or borrow it from the company). Second, exercise of the options
triggers a current tax liability if the stock's value exceeds the exercise
price.76 For example, assume the options' exercise price is $ioo per
share, and the stock is worth $150 per Share when the options are ex-
ercised. Managers must pay $ioo per share to the company, plus tax
on the $5o-per-share profit. These problems are mitigated if the exer-
cise price is low and the stock's fair market value is also low when the
options are exercised. To be clear, the manager does not really want
the stock's value to be low; rather, she wants to treat it as low for tax
purposes. Thus, the cost to the manager is far lower if the options' ex-
ercise price is $i per share and the common stock is valued at $I per
share when they are exercised. Managers can achieve this result if the
common stock is valued for tax purposes at only $I per share when the
options are granted, and the executives exercise the options immedi-
ately.77 To secure this tax benefit, entrepreneurs and managers some-
times negotiate for the right to exercise options immediately, even if
the options are not yet vested. In a "pre-exercise," as this step is some-
times called, the executive exercises the option, but the underlying
stock is subject to vesting. Again, the key to this self-help is a low tax
valuation for the common stock.
74 'Teas. Reg. § 1.83-7(a). The firm has a corresponding deduction that, as noted above, typi-
cally is unimportant in the venture capital context. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-6; supra note 57.
75 See BORIS I. BITTKER ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS
40.04, at 40-33 through 40-35 (3d ed. 2002); see also JOHN L. UTZ, NONSTATUTORY STOCK
OPTIONS, at A-5 n.39 (BNA Tax Management Portfolio 3 83 -3 d, 2OOl).
76 See David Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation of Incentive
Compatibility, ioo COLUM. L. REV. 440, 468-70 (2o00) (discussing the economic advantages to
executives of delaying exercise of their options).
77 In effect, option holders are trying to duplicate the result of a section 83 (b) election - a step
that, for technical reasons, is not available for nonqualified options. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-2(a)
(requiring the transfer of property within the meaning of Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(a) as a condition of
election); Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(a)(2) ("The grant of an option to purchase certain property does not
constitute a transfer of such property."); see also Schizer, supra note 76, at 493-94.
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B. The Impact of Convertible Preferred Stock on the Valuation of
Common Stock
We have seen that the tax treatment of managers' incentive com-
pensation turns on the valuation of common stock on the grant date.
When the manager and venture capitalist receive identical stock at
approximately the same time, and the venture capitalist pays more, the
tax law dictates a commonsense result: the price the venture capitalist
pays for the common stock sets its fair market value, and the discount
offered to the employee generally is taxed as ordinary income. 78  To
avoid this result, the tax planning goal is to drive a wedge between the
tax valuation of the manager's equity compensation, on one hand, and
the price the venture capitalist pays for its investment, on the other.
This is the tax reason for giving venture capitalists convertible pre-
ferred stock instead of common stock. 79
For tax purposes, the manager would like to value this common
stock at $I per share, thereby avoiding current tax and allowing any
subsequent appreciation to enjoy tax deferral and reduced rates. Yet
what is the theory for according such a low value to the stock, given
that the venture capitalists paid so much more for their investment?
The practitioner's standard answer is that the venture capitalists have
a senior security; if the firm liquidates immediately after the parties
make their investments, the managers will receive only $i per share.
The key to a reduced tax bill, then, is to value the common stock
based on a hypothetical immediate liquidation in which preferred
stockholders claim almost everything.
To an extent, it is fair to claim that the common stock is worth less
than the convertible preferred stock. The latter has greater control
rights and a liquidation preference that can prove valuable in the
zombie scenario. Yet these advantages only go so far. Indeed, if prior-
ity in liquidation is not worth very much in early-stage high-tech ven-
tures, as we argue in Part II, preferred stock should not be much more
valuable than common stock. Rather, the value of the common stock
in a capital structure with preferred stock (or any senior security) is de-
termined largely by its option value.80 In a venture capital portfolio
78 See Morton v. Comm'r, 1997 T.C.M. (RIA) 97,I66, at 1095, 1104 ("Determining fair mar-
ket value is often difficult where, as here, the subject property is the capital stock of a closely held
corporation for which no public market exists. In these circumstances, an actual arm's-length sale
of the stock in the normal course of business within a reasonable time before or after the valua-
tion date is the best evidence of fair market value."); Culp v. Comm'r, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 207, 212
(1989) (stock was valued at the price at which the taxpayer had submitted bids for the stock in
the over-the-counter market near the time at which he received the stock as compensation).
79 In a thoughtful early work, William Sahlman alludes to this tax planning goal, although he
does not develop the point. See Sahlman, supra note 5, at 5 TO.
80 See Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J.
POL. ECON. 637, 638 (1973). Theoretically, another way for the government to challenge these
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company, the common stock is effectively a long-term option with a
high variance, so the value will be substantial - approaching the
price the venture capitalist pays for convertible preferred stock that is
also, to a significant extent, an option. Yet this option value is irrele-
vant if the common stock's value, for tax purposes, is based on pro-
ceeds that hypothetically would be received in an immediate liquida-
tion. In other words, liquidation-based valuation is economically
na'ive, to say the least.
Despite the aggressiveness of looking to liquidation value, many
practitioners are willing to use it.81 In their view, IRS auditors may
not be sophisticated enough to recognize the option value inherent in
common stock. The auditors' more sophisticated bosses may be reluc-
tant to compel taxpayers to undertake the potentially complex and
subjective task of computing option value. In any event, Joseph Bart-
lett has observed that "[t]he Internal Revenue Service has never chal-
lenged successfully the view that the issuance of shares with a liquida-
tion preference - ordinarily labeled preferred stock - can 'eat up'
value in an amount equal to the preference, thereby reducing the
common stock (the 'cheap stock') to marginal value. '82 Similarly, Julie
valuations is to value the services provided in exchange for the stock. Cf. Larson v. Comm'r, 1988
T.C.M. (CCH) 1637, 1638 ("Where property received by a taxpayer does not have a readily ascer-
tainable fair market value, its value may be determined by reference to the fair market value of
the consideration given for the property."). We are not aware of any effort by the federal govern-
ment to use this valuation-of-services approach in the context of venture capital startups.
81 There is some authority for using liquidation value, but much of this authority involves
partnerships, not corporations. See, e.g., St. John v. United States, 84-1 U.S.T.C. 9158 (C.D. Ill.
1983) (using liquidation value to value partnership profits interest); see also infra pp. 907-09 (dis-
cussing treatment of partnership profits interests). Other cases involve corporations that are rea-
sonably likely to liquidate. See, e.g., Learner v. Comm'r, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 923, 927 (1983) (in
measuring the value of a charitable deduction, approving the liquidation method for a taxpayer's
minority interest, since there were reasonable prospects that the corporation would be liquidated,
including the out-of-date nature of firm's steel-manufacturing equipment and a pending deriva-
tive suit in which shareholders were seeking liquidation); Berckmans v. Comm'r, 20 T.C.M.
(CCH) 458, 467 (I96i) (in measuring whether a taxpayer received compensation for services
through bargain purchase of stock, approving the use of liquidation value because the corporation
was inactive and unproven, and emphasizing that, although the firm might become a vehicle for
acquiring active businesses, it might also remain an empty shell); Estate of Garrett v. Comm'r, i2
T.C.M. (CCH) 1142, 1150 (1953) (using liquidation value as fair market value, for purposes of es-
tate tax, where a logging company had long ceased to be active, its equipment was antiquated,
and its supply of timber nearly exhausted).
82 1 JOSEPH W. BARTLETT, EQUITY FINANCE: VENTURE CAPITAL BUYOUTS,
RESTRUCTURINGS AND REORGANIZATIONS 82-83 (2d ed. 1995). While the IRS has chal-
lenged such valuations in the estate tax area, see, e.g., Rev. Rul. 83-119, 1983-2 C.B. 57, Bartlett
emphasizes that it required a statutory change, section 2701, for the IRS to finally shut down the
practice. i BARTLETT, supra, at 83 n.24. Notably, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) has begun challenging these low valuations in a different context. For financial accounting
purposes, companies have assigned low valuations to their common stock at the time options are
granted to managers. The goal is to keep options from being treated as in-the-money when
granted, a precondition for minimizing compensation expense by keeping option expense out of
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Robinson, Lee Benton, and Robert Gunderson describe this tax strat-
egy as the primary reason for using convertible preferred stock in ven-
ture capital structure.8 3
Practitioners vary in how far they are willing to push this aggres-
sive strategy. A low valuation is probably easier for ISOs than for
other structures, since the statute expressly permits "good faith" valua-
tions in determining whether options qualify as ISOs. 84 Likewise, it is
helpful for time to pass between the issuance of common stock to ex-
ecutives and the investment by venture capitalists, so that executives
can argue that their common stock was worth less at this earlier time
before the company made important progress.8S Similarly, a low value
is safer for seed and early-round financings, when the firm does not
have a record of increased prices paid in additional financing rounds.
A government challenge is more likely if managers buy common stock
or receive options at a steeply discounted price shortly before a higher-
priced IPO, though practitioners report that the IRS seldom challenges
valuations even in this setting. 86
the body of the income statement. The SEC has begun raising this issue when reviewing IPO
prospectuses. See William A. Hines et al., Identifying and Avoiding "Cheap Stock" Problems,
in 2 VENTURE CAPITAL & PUBLIC OFFERING NEGOTIATION, supra note 29, at 29A-I, 29A-2
("In reviewing registration statements for initial public offerings, the SEC staff routinely analyzes
whether the issuer has recorded sufficient compensation expense with respect to stock options
1... This issue has received increasing attention from the SEC staff in recent years.").
83 According to these authors:
Once the decision has been made to go forward with the investment, choice of security
and determination of price represent the venture capitalist's most fundamental deci-
sions. Critical to the choice of security decision is usually the fact that founders and key
employees of the Company have bought, are buying, or will buy Common Stock from
the Company at a cheap price .... If Common Stock were to be sold to the investors at
a price [equal to full investment value], the tax consequences to the key employees con-
temporaneously buying Common Stock could be devastating .... As a result, it may be
very much in the interest of the founders and key employees that the investors purchase
senior securities that can be valued at a price higher than the Company's Common
Stock.
Julie M. Robinson et al., Portfolio Company Investments: Hi-Tech Corporation - Getting
to the Term Sheet, in i VENTURE CAPITAL & PUBLIC OFFERING NEGOTIATION, supra note
29, at 6-i, 6-7.
84 See section 422(c)(I).
85 LEVIN, supra note 42, 2oi.i.2, at 2-6. Another way to depress the common stock's value
is to impose restrictions that, by their terms, do not lapse; unlike vesting conditions, these
"nonlapse" conditions are relevant in valuing compensation for tax purposes. Although the man-
ager would have ordinary income if the nonlapse condition is later waived for a compensatory
purpose, parties might seek to justify the waiver with a noncompensatory purpose, a step that
many believe avoids this tax cost to the manager. See Matthew A. Rosen, The Many Continuing
Uncertainties of Section 83, in 6 TAX STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS,
DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS, JOINT VENTURES, FINANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS &
RESTRUCTURINGS 981, 1019-32 (PLI Tax Law & Estate Planning Series, Course Handbook
Series No. J- 4 7 7, 2000).
86 According to several practitioners, the convention in Silicon Valley once was the so-called
"ten-to-one rule," in which the executive's common stock was valued at one-tenth of the price
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C. Summary
In this Part we have identified the tax advantage of using converti-
ble preferred stock. Managers report a lower tax valuation for their
common stock, transforming current ordinary income into deferred
capital gain. Ironically, even though the venture capitalist's preference
is in some ways more formal than substantive, taxpayers use this form
to claim a real substantive benefit: favorable tax treatment for the
highly intense management incentives that are central to venture capi-
tal contracting.8 7 While we assert that a significant reason for using
convertible preferred stock is to attain this tax advantage, our argu-
ment is less persuasive if there are better ways to pursue this tax goal.
In the next Part, we consider likely alternatives.
IV. ALTERNATIVE TAX STRATEGIES
In what ways can high-tech start-up managers seek to transmute
ordinary income into deferred capital gain? This Part explores why
convertible preferred stock is used instead of three potential alterna-
tives. The first two - convertible debt and a unit composed of
straight preferred stock and common stock - would modify the busi-
ness deal, and could also impose significant tax costs on the venture
capitalist. The third alternative - partnership profits interests - is
arguably more effective than convertible preferred stock at attaining
the desired tax treatment, but presents other tax costs and is some-
times regarded as too complex and unfamiliar.
Moreover, while there are reasons to prefer convertible preferred
stock ab initio, there are also significant costs in departing from mar-
ket practice once enough firms have used this capital structure., For
example, legal fees are higher. Likewise, more time and resources
must be devoted to explaining the unique terms to all relevant parties,
and to allaying suspicions that these terms would disadvantage some-
one. Indeed, entrepreneurs and managers may find it reassuring for
their venture to follow market practice, since they otherwise may fear
that sophisticated venture capitalists are using an unconventional term
to extract a hard-to-identify concession. In other words, standardiza-
tion and precedent are a response to information asymmetry.
paid by the venture capitalist for convertible preferred. This rule of thumb, which was reportedly
based more on market practice than on a particular authority, is considered conservative by some.
One practitioner reported that iooo-to-I valuation ratios are sometimes used. These conclusions
are based on conversations with approximately thirty practitioners from July 2001 through Au-
gust 2002. These practitioners requested that their names and affiliations not be disclosed.
87 As discussed below, this strategy is less useful in other contexts. See infra p. 913.
88 See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 28, at 766-67. See generally Gilson & Kraakman, supra
note 28.
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A. The Venture Capitalist Receives Convertible Debt
In evaluating alternatives, we must remember that the key to en-
hancing managers' tax treatment is a low grant-date valuation for the
common stock. Under the aggressive liquidation method of valuation
described above, 9 convertible preferred stock accomplishes this end,
but so too would convertible debt.
Empirical evidence suggests that parties sometimes use convertible
debt,90 and some of the economics literature does not distinguish con-
vertible debt from convertible preferred stock for purposes of their
analysis.91 Even so, the use of debt instead of preferred stock changes
the deal. Creditors have more powerful remedies in the event of de-
fault than preferred stockholders, including the ability to force the firm
into bankruptcy.92  Likewise, debt is higher in priority than preferred
equity, although, as noted above, the value of this priority depends on
expectations about assets that will be available in liquidation. 93
In addition, the use of convertible debt instead of convertible pre-
ferred stock can increase the venture capitalist's tax bill by generating
"phantom income" - that is, income that is taxable before any cash is
received. 94  For instance, assume that the security promises the ven-
ture capitalist a periodic payment every year but allows the firm to de-
fer this payment. If the security is a debt instrument, this payment is
currently taxable as ordinary income, even if the actual receipt is de-
layed.95 In contrast, if parties document the security as preferred stock
89 See supra pp. 898-9oo.
90 See KAPLAN & STROMBERG, supra note 3, at 50 tbl.i (reporting, in a sample of 200 rounds
of venture capital financing, 19 rounds employing at least some convertible debt, compared to 159
rounds employing convertible preferred stock).
91 See, e.g., HELLMANN, supra note 3, at 4 n.2 ("[Participating convertible preferred equity] is
essentially the same as convertible debt, except that the firm is not required to make regular divi-
dend/coupon payments."); Gompers, supra note 3, at 2 n.i ("The payoff to convertible debt and
redeemable convertible preferred equity are essentially equivalent .... ); cf CORNELLI &
YOSHA, supra note 4, at 3 ("Since our model abstracts from taxes and control rights, it would
make little difference if we used convertible preferred equity rather than convertible debt.").
92 Practitioners thus report that firms are reluctant to give the venture capitalist creditor
status, if only because this step could make it more difficult to secure bank financing at a later
stage. A bank generally prefers not to share with others the ability to force a firm into bank-
ruptcy, because such sharing would reduce the bank's bargaining power.
93 Moreover, this preference arises only if the convertible debt is actually respected as debt by
the parties; this issue is a matter of some concern if interest is not paid on the debt because most
startups experience a significant period of negative cash flow.
94 See Peter A. Furci & David H. Schnabel, Convertible Preferred Stock Investments by Pri-
vate Funds: A Practical Guide to Tax Structuring, in i0 TAX STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE
ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS, JOINT VENTURES, FINANCINGS, REORGAN-
IZATIONS & RESTRUCTURINGS 2001, at 99, 927 (PLI Tax Law & Estate Planning Series,
Course Handbook Series No. J-51 3 , 2001) [hereinafter TAX STRATEGIES] (defining phantom in-
come and noting that "[i]nvestors in private funds tend to be very unhappy" when they receive it).
95 This result arises from the original issue discount (OID) rules, which generally require in-
vestors in certain securities to accrue interest income before receiving any cash. See generally sec-
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and structure the transaction with care, they should owe no tax unless
and until the security actually makes a payment. 96 A second tax ad-
tion 1272. This regime generally applies to bonds that are issued for less than they will pay at
maturity, as well as to bonds on which periodic payments may be deferred at the issuer's discre-
tion. See section 1273(a) (defining OID as the excess of the stated redemption price at maturity
over the issue price); Teas. Reg. § I.1273-I(b) (stated redemption price at maturity includes all
payments other than 'qualified stated interest"); id. § i.1273-I(c)(i)(i) (noting that interest is not
qualified stated interest unless it is "unconditionally payable").
A creative advisor might be able to avoid this phantom income by structuring the debt se-
curity so that it never makes a periodic payment under any circumstances and is not issued at a
discount. In other words, the venture capitalist's only compensation would come from the right
to convert the bond into common stock. Technically, the bond would no longer be a discount
bond (since the redemption price is equal to the issue price, assuming the bond is not converted).
Yet there is some risk of phantom income under the "contingent debt" regulations. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.1275-4. While this regime generally does not apply to traditional convertible bonds, see
id. § 1.1275-4(a)(4), some practitioners worry that nontraditional convertible bonds, such as those
with no coupon or discount, could still be covered by the contingent debt regime or, alternatively,
could be bifurcated into a warrant and a discount bond. See id. § I.I275-2(g)(I)-(2) (setting forth
the anti-abuse rule that provides for bifurcated treatment of a contingent debt instrument); Treas.
Reg. § I.I275-2(g)(3) (noting that the anti-abuse rule declines to recharacterize convertible debt,
but convertible debt in the example provides for annual payments of interest); Rev. Rul. 2002-3i,
2002-22 I.R.B. 1023, 1026 (treating contingent convertible bonds as governed by the contingent
debt regulations).
96 In fact, an important planning goal in these transactions is to keep the convertible preferred
stock from throwing off phantom income. The key is to avoid triggering section 305, which im-
putes phantom income on preferred stock in certain circumstances. See generally Furci & Schna-
bel, supra note 94, at 931-45 (discussing the imputation of income under section 3o5 and various
strategies used to avoid this result); Glen Kohl et al., Selected Issues Involving Preferred Stock
and Section 305, in io TAX STRATEGIES, supra note 94, at 757 (discussing the treatment of pre-
ferred stock under section 305). Although the nuances of this planning are beyond this Article's
scope, three points should be mentioned briefly. First, section 305 does not apply if the stock
"participate[s] in corporate growth to any significant extent." Treas. Reg. § 1.305-5(a). Oddly, for
this purpose, the fact that a security is convertible does not help. See id. ("The determination of
whether stock is preferred for purposes of section 305 shall be made without regard to any right to
convert such stock .... "). Some practitioners are comfortable, however, with similar economic
terms that are thought, technically, not to qualify as a "conversion" right. For instance, the inves-
tor might receive a claim in liquidation equal to the greater of the liquidation preference or the
amount a common shareholder claims. A more conservative fix is to use so-called "participating"
preferred stock, which, as discussed above, allows a holder to share in dividends and liquidations
as both a preferred and a common shareholder. See Furci & Schnabel, supra note 94, at 934-35;
see also 2 MARTIN D. GINSBURG & JACK S. LEVIN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND
BUYOUTS 1302.3.1 (2001) (discussing the use of participating preferred securities to avoid phan-
tom income under section 305).
Second, assuming that parties do not use participating preferred stock, a standard source of
phantom income is a redemption premium. See Treas. Reg. § 1.3o5-5(b)(I) (providing for the ac-
crual of income if the price the issuer pays in redeeming the preferred stock exceeds, by a suffi-
ciently large margin, the price investors initially paid to buy the stock). To avoid this result, pre-
ferred stock is often structured to include a periodic dividend payment instead of a redemption
premium. With this tweak, taxpayers often take the position that there is no phantom income
when these periodic payments are delayed, even though such deferral effectively turns the peri-
odic payments into a redemption premium. See Furci & Schnabel, supra note 94, at 940-43 (de-
scribing this technique as a common strategy for avoiding phantom income but cautioning that
legislative history suggests that the IRS has regulatory authority to find phantom income if the
issuer has no intention of paying dividends currently). This claim is aggressive for venture capital
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vantage of convertible preferred stock over debt is that stock can be
eligible for a special reduced tax rate for small businesses under Sec-
tion i202. 97 Another modest tax advantage of convertible preferred
stock is that, in the unlikely event that the stock actually pays divi-
dends, venture capitalists that are corporations can claim the divi-
dends-received deduction - a tax benefit that would not be available
if the security were structured as debt.98 A countervailing tax consid-
eration is that convertible debt affords the portfolio company a deduc-
tion for interest expense, while convertible preferred stock does not. 99
Yet deductions are of limited value to a portfolio company that is
likely to accumulate net operating losses over its early years of opera-
tion.100 Therefore, the economic characteristics of a financing transac-
tion involving convertible debt, and its tax consequences for venture
capitalists, are sufficiently disadvantageous to make convertible debt
financing a generally inferior method of obtaining the tax advantage of
convertible preferred stock.
startups because investors generally do not expect companies to pay dividends while the preferred
stock is outstanding. See Benton et al., supra note 29, at 8-8.
Finally, phantom income is less of a concern if the firm has no earnings and profits (E&P)
- as is initially the case with most startups - since dividends (whether phantom or actual) are
taxable as ordinary income only to the extent of E&P See sections 301(c), 316(a). Yet "many in-
vestors are understandably reluctant to rely" on the absence of E&P because of quirks in its com-
putation. Furci & Schnabel, supra note 94, at 930-31 (noting that a company can have E&P in
any year that it is profitable, even though losses from prior years dwarf this current E&P).
97 The taxpayer must satisfy a five-year holding period to claim section 1202's reduced rate.
With convertible debt, the time before the bond is converted does not count. But with convertible
preferred stock, the holding period includes the time prior to conversion. LEVIN, supra note 42,
9o6.i, at 9-2 1. In addition, with convertible debt only post-conversion gain is eligible for the
special rate, whereas with convertible preferred stock the entire gain is eligible. Id.
98 See section 243 (permitting a corporate recipient of a dividend to deduct either 7o%, 8o%,
or ioo% of the amount of the dividend, depending upon the extent of the taxpayer's ownership in
the firm). While venture capital firms are generally structured as partnerships, any partners that
are corporations could claim the dividends-received deduction for their share of the dividend.
99 See section 163 (authorizing deductions for interest expense).
100 See Joseph Bankman & Ronald J. Gilson, Why Start-Ups?, 51 STAN. L. REV. 289, 293-94
(1999); see also supra note 57. However, another advantage of debt, noted by Jack Levin, is that
redemption of the debt should be treated as tax-free return of capital. Redemption of preferred
stock, in contrast, is taxed as a dividend in some circumstances. See LEVIN, supra note 42,
603.8, at 6-3 to 6-24; see also infra note 104. Still another advantage of debt is that, if the inves-
tor is foreign, dividends are often subject to withholding tax while interest typically is not. See
section 87 I(h) (sparing certain interest payments to foreign individuals from withholding tax); sec-
tion 881(c) (same for foreign corporations). This consideration should be relatively unimportant in
high-tech startups, though, because the security is unlikely to yield any dividends before being
converted.
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B. The Venture Capitalist Receives a Unit Composed of Straight
Preferred Stock and Common Stock
A second alternative to convertible preferred stock is to give the
venture capitalist a unit comprising two securities: straight preferred
stock and common stock. The common stock permits the venture
capitalist to share in the gains of success, while the preferred stock
permits the parties to report an allocation of most of the venture capi-
talist's investment to it, enabling the entrepreneur to claim a low value
for her common stock and the ensuing tax benefits. 101 For instance,
assume a venture capitalist invests $i million in an enterprise. The
parties structure the transaction so that the venture capitalist formally
pays $99o,ooo for 99oo shares of preferred stock with a corresponding
liquidation preference (ioo% of the outstanding preferred), and
$io,ooo for io,ooo shares of common stock (50% of the outstanding
common). At the same time, the managers pay $io,ooo for io,ooo
shares of common stock (50% of the outstanding common). As with
convertible preferred stock, the managers can make the (aggressive)
argument that the common stock's value is low - $i per share - be-
cause of the preferred stock's priority.
Two factors suggest why this preferred-common unit is less popular
than pure convertible preferred stock. 102 First, the unit changes the
transaction by giving the venture capitalist a more favorable deal.
With typical convertible preferred stock, the venture capitalist must
choose between having preferred and having common, but cannot
make claims on both simultaneously. In the example in which the
venture capitalist invests $i million for preferred stock that is con-
vertible into io,ooo common shares, if the firm is being acquired for $4
million, the venture capitalist can either convert to common and claim
$2 million (half the sale proceeds, as owner of fifty percent of the
common) or keep the shares' preferred status and collect only $i mil-
lion (the liquidation preference). But with a unit, the venture capital-
ist can assert both claims at the same time - as both a preferred and
a common shareholder. Thus, the venture capitalist can claim
$990,0o0 of the acquisition proceeds through the preferred stock while
claiming half of what remains - 50% of $3,010,000, or $1,505,000 -
through the common. With a total of approximately $2.5 million, the
101 After showing that an entrepreneur would have significant ordinary income if she and the
venture capitalists all received common stock, see LEVIN, supra note 42, 201.1.1, at 2-4 to 2-5;
see also supra pp. 893-94, Jack Levin offers this preferred-common unit as a solution to this prob-
lem, see LEVIN, supra note 42, 202.2, at 2-io. He also discusses convertible preferred stock in
connection with this issue. See id. 203.1-203.2, at 2-2o to 2-22.
102 See KAPLAN & STROMBERG, supra note 3, at 49-5o tbl.i (reporting that i.5% of the fi-
nancing rounds in their sample involved preferred-common units, with either convertible or
straight preferred stock, while 94.5% involved convertible preferred stock alone).
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preferred-common unit yields $500,000 more than convertible pre-
ferred stock would yield alone.10 3 Entrepreneurs typically would pre-
fer not to give venture capitalists such a lucrative deal.
Second, even if venture capitalists can negotiate the more generous
deal - a plausible outcome as market conditions have dramatically
enhanced their bargaining power - the unit creates tax problems for
them. For instance, in some cases in which venture capitalists sell
their preferred stock, all of the sale proceeds could be treated as a
dividend. 10 4 In the previous example, if the venture capitalist sold the
preferred stock for $99o,ooo, this entire amount could be taxed as or-
dinary income (to the extent of the portfolio company's earnings and
profits), with no reduction for basis.10 5 One way to avoid this tax
problem is to use a "participating preferred" security that mimics the
business terms of a preferred-common unit, but is convertible in form.
Although documented as a single security, participating preferred stock
entitles the venture capitalist in a liquidation or acquisition to recover
the security's face value and then to share in any profits as if it also
held a share of common stock. 10 6  While the security is economically
103 Obviously, this economic difference is relatively insignificant if the firm fails. As discussed
above, the failed firm is unlikely to have sufficient assets in liquidation to pay the preferred liqui-
dation preference, let alone to pay anything to common stockholders. See supra pp. 883-84.
104 If the venture capitalist sells the preferred stock back to the firm (for example, pursuant to a
mandatory redemption provision), this sale could be treated as a dividend under section 302 if the
venture capitalist keeps the common stock, because the venture capitalist's percentage ownership
might not decline sufficiently through the redemption. This problem is more significant if the
venture capitalist has a majority stake. See LEVIN, supra note 42, 603.8, at 6-23 to 6-24. One
"fix" would be to require the common stock to be redeemed whenever the preferred stock is re-
deemed. In any event, as noted above, dividends are taxed as ordinary income only to the extent
that the firm has E&P - something that, in a new venture, typically will not happen for a num-
ber of years, although there may be E&P by the time the venture capitalist sells the stock. See
supra note 96.
105 Another problem is that, theoretically, the venture capitalist could have phantom income
under this structure. The IRS might challenge the allocation of purchase price, asserting that the
actual issue price of the preferred stock was less than its $99o,ooo redemption price - notwith-
standing the parties' reported allocation of the investment between preferred and common stock
- because the common stock was worth more than $io,ooo. If the IRS challenges the valuation
in this way, the preferred stock would have a redemption premium and thus could have phantom
income. See Treas. Reg. § 1.305-5(b). For a discussion, see 2 GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 96,
1 1302.3.1(2), at 13-22. Obviously, this issue can arise only if the government challenges the par-
ties' low valuation of the common stock - a scenario that many consider unlikely, as discussed
supra section III.B. In any event, this risk of phantom income disappears if the parties use par-
ticipating preferred stock; with a single security instead of a unit, they would not need to allocate
the purchase price (that is, between common and preferred stock). Cf. 2 GINSBURG & LEVIN,
supra note 96, 1302.3.1(4), at 13-23 to 13-24 (noting that constructive distribution rules generally
do not apply to participating preferred stock).
106 See 2 GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 96, 1302.3.1(4), at 13-24 (describing how converti-
ble preferred stock can be given "substantial participation features").
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comparable to a unit, it is formally different and, for technical reasons,
less likely to saddle the venture capitalist with ordinary income. 1 0 7
In sum, although a preferred-common unit offers managers as
strong a tax argument as traditional convertible securities, this struc-
ture changes the business deal and introduces a potential tax cost for
the venture capitalist. If the parties actually prefer this revised busi-
ness deal, they will use an alternative - participating preferred stock
- that is less likely to saddle the venture capitalist with a new tax
cost.
C. The Use of Partnership Structure and the Grant of Profits Interests
to Managers
The alternatives to convertible preferred stock canvassed so far de-
pend, like classic convertible preferred stock itself, on an aggressive
valuation. To establish that their common stock is not valuable, the
managers claim that the venture capitalist's preferences are very valu-
able. In this respect, taxpayers are relying on the IRS's willingness to
ignore the common stock's option value. In contrast, a final alterna-
tive avoids aggressive and uneconomic valuations, relying instead on a
favorable principle of partnership tax law.
Under straightforward rules of partnership tax, a partner is not
currently taxed upon receiving a "profits interest" in the partnership in
return for performing or promising to perform services. These inter-
ests provide a share only of income that the partnership earns after the
taxpayer becomes a partner. Unlike a "capital interest," a profits inter-
est yields nothing if the partnership liquidates and distributes prior
earnings on the day that the taxpayer becomes a partner. As a result,
tax law treats the partner, in effect, as receiving nothing when she ac-
quires the partnership interest. This is an economically questionable
conclusion, because the profits interest may have considerable value.'0 8
Even so, the partner is not taxed until she begins sharing the partner-
ship's earnings. ' 0 9
107 Because the "preferred" component of this security is inseparable from the "common" com-
ponent, venture capitalists are never in the position of selling the preferred stock by itself. Hence,
they can never be subject to section 302, which, as noted above, can impose adverse consequences
on this step. See supra note IO4; see also supra note 96 (discussing other tax advantages to ven-
ture capitalists of participating preferred stock).
108 Just ask a new partner at Cravath, Swaine & Moore whether making partner, and gaining
the continued right to use the firm's reputation and assets, affects her net worth.
109 The details and history of this rule are beyond this Article's scope. In general, a widely fol-
lowed judicial decision seemed to suggest that profits interests would have to be valued and taxed
when received. See Diamond v. Comm'r, 56 TC. 530, 544-47 (i97i), affd, 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir.
1974). But cf. Campbell v. Comm'r, 943 F.2d 815, 823 (8th Cir. i99i) ("[W]e doubt that the tax
court correctly held that Campbell's profits interests were taxable upon receipt."). The tax bar
responded with a wave of criticism that focused on difficulties in administering this rule. In re-
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Armed with this deferral rule for profits interests, managers can
ensure that their compensation is taxed on a deferred basis at long-
term capital gains rates, with no risk of a valuation challenge by the
IRS. 1 0 As an example, assume that a portfolio company is organized
as a partnership, instead of as a corporation. The managers receive
profits interests when they begin employment, while the venture capi-
talist holds a capital interest in return for cash contributions. The par-
ties can allocate voting and governance rights any way that they de-
sire, thereby allowing the separation of control rights and cash flow
rights that is central to venture capital contracting. The critical fea-
ture, of course, is a "preference" for the venture capitalist's capital in-
terest: if the partnership were to liquidate immediately after the man-
agers received their profits interests, the venture capitalist would have
to receive all the assets."' As long as the transaction satisfies the for-
malities of Revenue Procedure 93-27, managers will not have any or-
dinary income upon receiving the profits interest." 2 Sale of the profits
interest generally yields capital gain. Profits earned before the man-
ager sells the interest are taxed as ordinary income, but such income
rarely arises in early-stage startups."13
In short, the partnership alternative offers essentially the same tax
benefits as the convertible preferred stock strategy: replacing current
ordinary income with deferred capital gain. Indeed, the partnership
sponse, the government issued Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343, which exempts profits interests
from current tax as long as the interests satisfy specified requirements. See id. at 344.
110 See Michael J. Halloran et al., Agreement of Limited Partnership, in i VENTURE CAPITAL
& PUBLIC OFFERING NEGOTIATION I-I, 1-5O (Michael J. Halloran et al. eds., 3 d ed. Supp.
1999).
Ill See Rev. Proc. 2001-43, 2001-34 I.R.B. ioi (providing that the relevant date for determining
whether a partnership interest is a profits interest is the grant date, even if the interest is substan-
tially nonvested at the time of grant).
112 See Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343. The Revenue Procedure provides that its favorable
tax treatment is not available if the profits interest relates to a substantially certain stream of in-
come, if the partner sells the profits interest within two years, or if the partnership is publicly
traded within the meaning of section 7704 (b). Id.
113 To shelter the manager from this ordinary income, the parties can organize the venture as a
corporation, while "wrapping" the corporation in a partnership. In other words, the manager and
venture capitalist own a partnership (with profits and capital interests, respectively), and the
partnership owns stock in a corporation that holds the venture's assets. With this structure, the
manager's profit interest yields only capital gain when the partnership sells the portfolio com-
pany's stock in an IPO. One vulnerability of this arrangement, though, is that the partnership
seems to serve no purpose - other than allowing managers access to the tax rule for profits inter-
ests - and thus the government might disregard it for tax purposes. A further vulnerability is
that the manager may be deemed to have received the profits interest in a capacity other than as
partner. Even assuming the structure is respected, moreover, it does not avoid the tax on ordinary
income, but merely shifts the burden from the manager to the corporation, which is still taxed on
this ordinary income. As noted above, strategies that generate capital gain for the manager typi-
cally impose an offsetting tax cost on the firm and are most sensible when the firm is in a low tax
bracket. See supra note 57.
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strategy is especially effective because it is based on a formal IRS posi-
tion rather than on unstated practice.
This immunity from valuation-based challenges is a reason to or-
ganize startups as partnerships (or, specifically, as limited-liability
companies that are taxed as partnerships). An additional tax benefit
that Professor Joseph Bankman emphasizes is the potential for part-
ners to deduct startup losses. Yet although startups sometimes use this
form, it is not the "standard" structure for startups, for reasons Bank-
man describes.' 14  For instance, the partnership form can complicate
the tax positions of foreign and tax-exempt investors. 115 Additionally,
partnerships are ineligible for certain tax benefits otherwise available
to startups. 1 6 Partnerships also involve complicated tax reporting on
K-i forms, which are unfamiliar and potentially confusing to many en-
trepreneurs. In contrast, the convertible preferred approach is ac-
cepted and understood: for reasons that suggest path dependence," 7 it
would be costly for the venture capitalist to investigate an alternative
structure and explain it to entrepreneurs and portfolio company em-
ployees.
V. VALUATION RULES AS A SUBSIDY
While our primary purpose in this Article is positive, explaining the
tax reason for using convertible preferred stock in U.S. venture capital
structure, it is also important to examine this tax planning normatively
by asking what goals it promotes. If the policy goal is to conform the
treatment of high-tech startup employees (who are now receiving de-
ferred capital gain) with the tax treatment of other employees (who re-
ceive immediately taxable ordinary income), then the tax authorities
should crack down on this planning by challenging the managers' ag-
gressive and economically nalve valuations."l 8
114 See Bankman, supra note 9, at 1741-47; see also Victor Fleischer, The Rational Exuber-
ance of Venture Capital Startups (2002) (working paper, on file with the Harvard Law School
Library). Still another advantage of a partnership is that it is easier to sell part of the business
without triggering entity-level gain. In contrast, a startup organized as a corporation would have
difficulty avoiding corporate-level gain upon selling a portion of its assets. See section 3 ix(b).
For instance, a spinoff followed by a tax-free acquisition triggers an entity level tax. See section
355(e). We are indebted to Andrew Berg for this point.
115 If the startup generates "unrelated business taxable income" and "effectively connected in-
come," this income will flow through directly to tax-exempt and foreign investors in the venture
capital fund, causing them to owe taxes and to file returns. See Fleischer, supra note 114.
116 For instance, a fifty percent exclusion for gains from certain "qualified small business stock"
is available only for C corporation stock. See section 1202(c). Likewise, an investment in one
startup sometimes can be replaced, tax-free, with an investment in another startup, but again, this
"rollover" is available only for stock in a C corporation. See section 1045.
117 See generally Kahan & Klausner, supra note 28.
118 Conventional reasons to pursue such parity include horizontal equity (so that executives
who earn the same amount pay the same tax) and efficiency (so that executives who otherwise
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But what if the government's goal, instead, is to promote high-tech
startups? We take no position here about the wisdom of this goal, 1 19
but assuming that the government wishes to commit resources to pro-
moting high-tech startups, economically inaccurate valuations may
serve a useful purpose. 120  Specifically, the government's tolerance of
aggressively low valuations might be understood as a form of tax sub-
sidy for high-tech startups, targeted at a critical feature of the venture
capital contracting process: the high-intensity performance incentives
provided to managers of early-stage companies. The IRS allows a
substantial portion of a high-tech startup manager's compensation -
in effect, wages for services - to be taxed as capital gain, instead of as
ordinary income. 121
prefer to work for established firms are not lured, by tax considerations, to work at high-tech
startups).
119 There is a growing literature on the desirability of government efforts to promote high-tech
startups and on the various tax and other measures that might achieve this goal. These measures
include changing the tax rate structure and the treatment of net operating losses. These interest-
ing issues, however, are beyond this Article's scope. For a discussion of these issues, see
BRONWYN H. HALL, THE FINANCING OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8773, 2002) (recommending further study of governmental
seed capital and subsidy programs to remedy funding gaps for research and development);
Rosanne Altshuler & Alan J. Auerbach, The Significance of Tax Law Asymmetries: An Empirical
Investigation, IO5 Q.J. ECON. 6I, 70-75 (199o) (discussing the effect of loss limitations on risky
activity); Robert Caroll et al., Entrepreneurs, Income Taxes, and Investment, in DOES ATLAS
SHRUG?: THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH 427 (Joel B. Slemrod ed.,
2000) (finding that high marginal tax rates discourage entrepreneurs from making new invest-
ments in their businesses); William M. Gentry & R. Glenn Hubbard, Tax Policy and Entrepreneu-
rial Entry, 9o AM. ECON. REV. 283 (2ooo) (finding that a flatter rate structure encourages entre-
preneurship); Roger H. Gordon, Can High Personal Tax Rates Encourage Entrepreneurial
Activity?, 45 IMF STAFF PAPERS 49 (1998) (noting the positive externalities associated with in-
novative entrepreneurship and arguing that disparities between corporate and individual income
taxes encourage entrepreneurship); and James Poterba, Venture Capital and Capital Gains Taxa-
tion, in 3 TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 47, 48-56 (Lawrence H. Summers ed., 1989) (argu-
ing that reductions in the capital gains rate can increase the level of venture capital activity by
encouraging entrepreneurs to join startups).
120 Cf. generally David M. Schizer, Realization as Subsidy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1549 (1998) (not-
ing that another economically inaccurate regime, the realization rule, can be viewed as a subsidy
with the appealing attribute of credibility).
121 While wages are generally taxed as ordinary income, the exception we describe is one of at
least three available to entrepreneurs. Capital gain treatment is also available to entrepreneurs
who can characterize their contribution as property, instead of services, although this should be a
relatively small group in the high-tech context. See supra note 55. Likewise, capital gains are
available to entrepreneurs who do not seek outside equity financing. In return for a modest cash
contribution, they can purchase loo% of the firm's stock. Thereafter, they can pay themselves a
modest salary while earning most of their return through stock appreciation. Again, though, this
simple strategy is difficult to use in high-tech startups: given the negative cash flows associated
with early-stage high-tech companies, they usually need substantial outside financing to grow a
business. In a sense, the planning strategy described in this Article levels the playing field for
high-tech startups, allowing them a tax benefit that already is available to the more limited set of
firms using the property-contribution and internal-financing strategies.
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We doubt that the IRS intends to subsidize venture capital in this
way.122 Instead, it is likely that unsophisticated auditing and adminis-
trability concerns have spawned the government's tolerance of aggres-
sive valuations. Yet the venture capital community has become accus-
tomed to this tax benefit - recall Joseph Bartlett's colorful reference
to "eat-em-up" convertible preferred stock 23 - and can be expected to
employ its political muscle to protect the implicit subsidy if the IRS
begins challenging liquidation-based valuations. 2 4  Thus, however it
began, the practice now functions as a tax subsidy.12 5
Despite its unintentional origins, the practice has several appealing
characteristics when evaluated as a subsidy. First, for a manager to
claim this tax benefit, private investors must first determine that the
manager's project warrants their participation. Specifically, a private
investor must purchase a senior security in order for a low valuation of
122 Of course, other related venture capital tax subsidies are intentional. See, e.g., section 1202
(offering special reduced tax rate for certain small business stock); section 1045 (providing a roll-
over for small business stock); see also David A. Guenther & Michael Willenborg, Capital Gains
Tax Rates and the Cost of Capital for Small Businesses: Evidence from the IPO Market, 53 J. FIN.
ECON. 385, 396-403 (1999) (finding empirical evidence that section 12o2 reduces the cost of capi-
tal for qualifying small businesses).
123 See i BARTLETT, supra note 82, at 82-83.
124 In an analogous circumstance, Silicon Valley mobilized to prevent the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) from adopting a more sophisticated approach to financial accounting for
stock options, in which the option value of grants would have been expensed. See, e.g., Stock Op-
tions Charade: High Cost Gets Buried in the Footnotes, Bloomberg News, Mar. 14, 2ooo, LEXIS,
Nexis News Library, Bloomberg News File. FASB compromised by allowing the option expense
to be placed in footnotes instead of in the body of the income statement. FASB feared congres-
sional intervention after "Silicon Valley workers staged a protest. FASB was bombarded with
almost 1,8oo letters denouncing the idea - one of the biggest responses it had ever received for a
proposed accounting change. Congress called for hearings." Id.; see also Mark Schwanhausser,
Accounting-Rule Debate Has Shifted to Overseas: Change in Options Would Trim Profits,
SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 5, 2ooi, at C5, LEXIS, Nexis News Library, Seattle Times File. "Flexing
its political muscle like never before, the high-tech community turned the U.S. board into a four-
letter word on the streets of Silicon Valley. When the board held hearings in the valley in 1994,
3,000 workers rallied in 'Stop FASB' T-shirts." Id. The issue arose again in 20o2 after a series of
financial scandals, but again the accounting rules went unchanged (though some firms voluntarily
began expensing options). See Karen Talley, Expensing Options Will Affect Small-Cap Firms,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 2002, at C8 (noting Standard & Poor's report that seventy-six companies
have announced an intention to expense stock options).
125 In describing this tax reduction as a "subsidy," our baseline is current law's treatment of
wage income. Thus, the tax burden on services provided to high-tech startups (deferred tax at
capital gains rates) is a departure from the tax burden generally imposed on wages (current tax at
ordinary rates). Of course, it is possible to redefine the baseline so that the tax rule discussed here
would no longer seem like a subsidy because it would no longer constitute a divergence from the
general rule. If instead the baseline is the law's treatment of entrepreneurship, then the departure
that this Article emphasizes is less clear since, as noted above, capital gain is available in other
contexts as well. See supra note 12 i. In theory, we could change our normative baseline even
more drastically. For example, tax deferral would be the norm under certain types of consump-
tion taxes as long as wages have not yet been spent. Yet such inquiries are beyond this Article's
scope, since we do not undertake here to determine the normatively correct tax treatment of
entrepreneurship in a world with a perfect tax base.
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the common stock to be offered. Thus, the government commits re-
sources (in the form of a tax reduction for the managers) only if private
investors are also willing to do so. In the paradigm case, these private
investors are sophisticated venture capitalists, who have the expertise
to identify and nurture promising projects, who prove their commit-
ment to the ventures by investing their own funds, and who are moti-
vated by performance-based pay and reputational concerns associated
with the success of the venture capital funds they operate. 12 6 As a re-
sult, the government can "piggyback" on the judgments of sophisti-
cated private parties. 2 7 In effect, the government becomes a passive
investor in any positive externalities thrown off by a vigorous venture
capital market, such as technological advances.
This subsidy thus lets the government avoid either selecting for it-
self which companies are sufficiently promising to merit direct subsi-
dies or blindly providing the subsidy to all projects without the benefit
of any quality screening. If it chose the projects itself, the government
would be undertaking the role of venture capitalist without the skills
or incentive structure that have developed in the private sector.128
Government decisionmakers might also be subject to lobbying and
other political influences. 129 In addition, the government cannot offer
the contributions, aside from money, that venture capitalists make to
startups: the venture capitalist also acts as reputational intermediary,
management consultant, and performance monitor. 130  With the sub-
sidy described in this Article, however, the provision of these services
by a venture capitalist is a functional precondition to favorable tax
treatment.13 '
126 Gilson, supra note 2o, at 15-28.
127 The venture capitalist's relationship to the government here is like the "branding" role that
venture capitalists are known to play with suppliers, customers, and institutional investors. If the
venture capitalist takes a venture seriously enough to back it financially, others will take the ven-
ture seriously too. See Black & Gilson, supra note 26, at 254 (noting that involvement of venture
capitalists reassures suppliers and customers); Thomas Hellmann & Manju Puri, Venture Capital
and the Professionalization of Start-Up Firms: Empirical Evidence, 57 J. FIN. I69, 176-8I (2002)
(discussing the contributions of venture capitalists to a portfolio company's business).
128 Ralf Becker and Thomas Hellmann have provided an instructive account of the failure of a
German governmental effort to provide a direct subsidy to early-stage technology. RALF
BECKER & THOMAS HELLMANN, THE GENESIS OF VENTURE CAPITAL: LESSONS FROM
THE GERMAN EXPERIENCE (Graduate School of Business, Stanford Univ., Working Paper No.
1705, 2000). Cf. generally James M. Poterba, Capital Gains Tax Policy Toward Entrepreneurship,
42 NAT'L TAX J. 375 (i989) (finding that the Small Business Innovation Research Program, a
direct-grant program implemented in the United States, served a useful certification function, but
produced inconsistent results across regions and industries).
129 See Gilson, supra note 20, at 47.
130 Black & Gilson, supra note 26, at 253-55.
131 As noted above, there are other ways of attaining capital gains treatment that do not in-
volve venture capitalists and senior securities, such as characterizing the entrepreneur's contribu-
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A further advantage is this subsidy's narrow scope. While this
strategy benefits risky startups - and, indeed, is especially vital in the
venture capital context because incentive compensation is so important
- it is not readily transplanted to mature firms. To claim this tax
benefit, a firm must possess a number of characteristics. First, it must
not be currently profitable, so that the loss of compensation deductions
will not be a problem.1 32 Second, the firm must have a significant po-
tential for profit, so that employees will be enthusiastic about option-
like equity compensation. Third, the compensation must be difficult to
value currently, so that an aggressive tax valuation can be taken with
a straight face; yet the compensation must also not be difficult to value
in the future, so that executives can eventually become liquid. Finally,
the firm must be risky. The tax benefit, after all, aims to enable man-
agers to avoid ordinary income tax on the "option" value of the com-
mon stock. The riskier the firm, the greater this option value will be.
High-tech startups obviously satisfy all of these conditions, but other
firms typically do not. 133
Ease of administration is another favorable characteristic of this
self-executing subsidy. This sort of subsidy largely avoids two com-
mon costs of tax expenditures: adding complexity to the tax system
and distorting taxpayer behavior. The relevant tax rules here are easy
to administer. The subsidy depends on the IRS's reluctance to chal-
lenge low valuations of common stock. Ironically, it could prove more
administratively costly to eliminate the subsidy by constantly litigating
valuation. Indeed, the tax authorities, in tolerating the current prac-
tice, presumably have been more interested in administrability than in
subsidizing high-tech startups. By analogy, administrability was cer-
tainly the reason for the favorable tax treatment of partnership profits
interests. The government presumably did not intend to subsidize ac-
tivity carried out in the partnership form (nor did it believe that the
option value was zero). Additionally, it is not especially onerous, from
the taxpayer's perspective, to claim the tax benefit in the venture capi-
tal context: the key is to use both common and convertible preferred
securities. While this tiered capital structure may not suit everyone,
tion as property or not seeking outside equity financing, but these strategies are generally unsuit-
able for high-tech startups. See supra note 12 1.
132 As noted above, the manager's tax strategy has an offsetting tax cost to the firm: reducing
the firm's deductions for compensation expense. See supra note 57. While a profitable firm
would regret losing these deductions, an unprofitable firm has less need for them.
133 The narrowness of this measure's scope is not easy to duplicate. For instance, it would be
difficult to draft a statutory test for determining whether a firm is risky. See Poterba, supra note
128, at 383-84.
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there are obviously nontax reasons to use it, including the incentive,
signaling, and control rationales discussed above. 134
A final characteristic of this self-executing subsidy is that, in setting
the subsidy's size, it substitutes the market for the congressional budg-
eting process. The venture capital market is cyclical, as the current
downturn demonstrates. Thus, the efficient size of the subsidy de-
pends on the presence of promising new technologies to finance, which
will change based on the fits and starts of scientific progress. Congres-
sional budgeting necessarily lags behind the market's evaluation of the
level of attractive financing opportunities because of the government's
lack of expertise and the inevitable delay associated with the political
process. A self-executing subsidy automatically keyed to the level of
venture capital financing constantly adjusts to the market's assessment
of the level of viable projects.
Of course, these significant advantages must be balanced against
potential disadvantages, although we believe that the disadvantages
generally are manageable, assuming a subsidy is desired. First, there
are the familiar disadvantages of relying on tax rules instead of on di-
rect government expenditures. 135  As with any tax expenditure, this
subsidy may be hard for the political process to monitor. In addition,
while it is easy to cap a direct grant, capping is more difficult here be-
cause it requires a limit on the amount of option value that could be
spared from immediate taxation. 136 Nevertheless, the venture capital-
ist's self-interest limits the amount of equity the entrepreneur receives
and, as noted above, the fact that the overall subsidy's size shifts with
the level of venture capital funding is an advantage.
A further concern is that taxpayers must take aggressive positions
to claim the subsidy. Thus, aggressive taxpayers fare better than con-
servative ones. Not only is this disparity inequitable, but it also can
have unfortunate incentive effects. When the government fails to re-
spond to aggressive tax planning in one context, aggressiveness is
likely to increase in other contexts as well, undermining the culture of
134 If it is onerous to use this capital structure, the subsidy theoretically could be improved by
making it more broadly available (in an all-common capital structure, for example). Yet there is a
risk that the subsidy would become too widely available (to mature industries as well as startups,
for example). An advantage of the current subsidy, as noted above, is relatively narrow tailoring.
See supra p. 913.
135 See supra note 13.
136 Another potential disadvantage is that this subsidy does not allow the government to favor
first-time or low-income entrepreneurs and managers. The subsidy here has the opposite effect:
high-bracket taxpayers benefit the most from transforming ordinary income into capital gain, and
social policy concerns are unlikely to influence venture capitalists' selection of projects. Yet if the
goal is efficiency instead of equity, it is appropriate to target ventures that have earned the confi-
dence of professional investors and use other programs to pursue distributional goals.
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voluntary compliance. 137 Yet the government can address this concern
in more than one way. While the obvious response is to challenge ag-
gressive valuations, an alternative is to issue a notice accepting them
as a matter of law. As with partnership profits interests, the liquida-
tion method can be expressly approved in this context. Through a no-
tice, conservative taxpayers will be free to claim the tax benefit, such
that aggressiveness will no longer be rewarded.
A final problem with current law is that although the government
can rely on the judgments of private parties, it has no opportunity to
evaluate the soundness of these judgments. 13 Unlike an investor in a
venture capital limited partnership, the government cannot decline to
reinvest if past investments have performed poorly. In theory, more-
over, the tax subsidy is available as long as someone buys convertible
preferred stock - not just a venture capitalist, but also the entrepre-
neur's unsophisticated father-in-law (although "angel" investors gener-
ally do not invest through convertible preferred stock 139). The subsidy
is, in effect, a government investment in an index fund composed of all
startups that can secure external financing. In a direct expenditure
program, by contrast, the government could decide which co-investors
to trust. Yet, as noted above, the government is not necessarily up to
this task. Thus, the absence of a screening process is simply the flip
side of one of the subsidy's advantages: the government does not make
project selection choices.
On balance, then, the subsidy identified here has significant advan-
tages, as well as potential disadvantages that strike us as largely man-
ageable. Ultimately, though, our point here is not to advocate particu-
lar forms of venture capital subsidies; indeed, we have not addressed
the substantive case for a subsidy at all. Rather, we want only to high-
light the unusual characteristics of the indirect subsidy that has devel-
oped. Direct subsidies to foster a venture capital industry are com-
monplace in other countries, typically with quite limited success. 140
The self-executing subsidy we have highlighted here has characteristics
- especially the use of properly incentivized intermediaries as the sub-
sidy's gatekeepers - that may prove useful in such efforts.
137 See David M. Schizer, Sticks and Snakes: Derivatives and Curtailing Aggressive Tax Plan-
ning, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1339, 1353 (2ooo) ("As planning becomes widespread, it can undermine
the morale of conservative taxpayers (a form of deadweight loss) and increase the government's
administrative costs (e.g., if norms change so that taxpayers are less likely to comply voluntar-
ily).").
138 Similarly, the private parties are insulated to an extent from the adverse effects of a poor
decision because they have senior securities. Yet the economic significance of this protection
should not be overstated, see supra section II.A.2. We are indebted to Jim Hines for this point.
139 George W. Fenn et al., The Role of Angel Investors in Financing High-Tech Start-Ups o-io
(1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
140 See Gilson, supra note 2o, at 45-47.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have extended the financial economics literature
on the ubiquity of convertible preferred stock in venture capital struc-
ture. We have explained how the use of this security triggers a tax re-
duction for the intensely incentivized management compensation that
is central to venture capital contracting. We have also emphasized the
advantages of this form of self-executing subsidy: the government uses
properly trained and incentivized private parties, instead of a bureauc-
racy, as a gatekeeper for the subsidy. More generally, we have illus-
trated the vital link between tax and capital structure, and have em-
phasized the need to examine deep institutional detail to illuminate the
complexities of capital structure and security design.
